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Wrongful birth1 is an action sounding in tort2 brought by the parents of an
unplanned child against a physician who performs an unsuccessful sterilization operation
or abortion, or who improperly diagnoses the fact of pregnancy or the physical condition
of the fetus during pregnancy.3 The plaintiffs’ complaint most typically alleges that the
physician’s negligence caused the parents to suffer the conception or birth of the child.4

1

Wrongful birth actions must be distinguished from actions for wrongful life. A suit for wrongful life is
brought by parents on behalf of the child himself to recover damages for having been allowed to be born.
For example, in Berman v. Allen, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979), a Downs syndrome child alleged that had the
defendant informed her mother of the availability of amniocentesis, and performed that test, her mother
would have terminated the pregnancy and she would never have come into existence.
Wrongful life actions have not met with favor in the courts. The reason most frequently offered
for denying the claim is the impossibility of calculating damages. Since the purpose in awarding damages
is compensation, the child bringing the wrongful life action is actually demanding the court to measure the
difference between the value of his existence (caused by the negligence) and that of his nonexistence (that
is, his value if the negligent act had not occurred). The courts have responded that the value of life as
opposed to nonlife is incapable of measurement. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 227 A.2d 689, 692
(1967).
Only three states recognize a cause of action for wrongful life: California, New Jersey and
Washington. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), Procanik v.
Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
For a discussion of wrongful life, see Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life Actions, 40 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 141 (2005); Comment,
WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH CAUSES OF ACTION - SUGGESTIONS FOR A CONSISTENT ANALYSIS,
63 Marq. Law Rev. 612-21 (1980).
2
Actions for wrongful birth have also sounded in contract and warranty. E.g., see Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass.
764, 551 N.E. 2d 1 (1990), Ball v. Mudge, 391 P. 2d 201 (Wash. 1964) (Parents brought suit alleging that
the physician breached his implied warranty in failing to render the father sterile). These suits usually have
not met with success because courts will dismiss the action unless the plaintiff can prove separate
consideration for the fee for the sterilization operation. Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510. But see Custodio
v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (court infers that through physician’s failure to
warn the patient of the possibility of failure of treatment, he guaranteed success without qualifications).
Because of the prevalence of suits brought in tort for negligence, and their rate of success, this
Article will deal only with that cause of action for wrongful birth.
3
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (unsuccessful vasectomy); and Bowman v.
Davis, 356 N.E. 2d 496 (Ohio, 1976) (unsuccessful tubal ligation).
One court has also allowed parents of an unplanned child to bring an action for wrongful birth
against a pharmacist who negligently substituted a tranquilizer while filling a prescription for an oral
contraceptive. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
4
See, e.g., Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442
A.2d 1003 (1982) (physician’s negligent performance of sterilization of plaintiff mother caused her to give
birth to unplanned child), See infra, notes 100-112 and accompanying text; Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. .239,
628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982) (physician’s negligent performance of sterilization on plaintiff father caused
plaintiffs to parent an unwanted child). See, infra notes 113-125 and accompanying text; Speck v.

2

The parents of the wrongfully born infant pray for compensation for the losses they have
sustained as a result of the birth.
Originally, claims for wrongful birth were categorically denied.5 In the first
wrongful birth suit, Christensen v. Thornby,6 the Minnesota Supreme Court denied the
parents’ claim, maintaining that the birth of any child was a “blessed” event.7 And,
twenty-three years later, a Pennsylvania court, in Shaheen v. Knight,8 reasoned that since
procreation was the chief purpose of marriage, it could not sustain the married plaintiff’s
action for wrongful birth.9 Thus, adherence to these deeply rooted sentiments grounded
in public policy caused the injured parents of an unwanted child to be deprived of a legal
remedy.
Three decades after the first wrongful birth case was decided, it became apparent
that a shift in this once pervasive social policy was emerging.10 This transition was
evidenced by two United States Supreme Court cases. In 1965, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,11 the Court held that the decision of a man and woman to procreate or use
some form of birth control fell within their constitutionally protected right to privacy.12
Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1982) (physicans’ negligent performance of both sterilization and
abortion procedures caused parents to give birth to a genetically defective child), See, infra notes 158-170
and accompanying text; Naccash v. Burger, 233 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d. 825 (1982) (physician’s negligent
diagnosis of parents’ hereditary disease caused parents to forego abortion of affected child). See, infra
notes 171-180 and accompanying text.
5
See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. &
C. 2d 41, 45 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
6
912 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
7
Id.
8
11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41, 45 (Lycoming Cty. 1957).
9
Id.
10
See, e.g., Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964). Although the Washington court denied
the parent’s claim for summary judgment in a wrongful birth action, it opined, “Our holding for the
physician should not be construed as an expression of opinion by this court on physician’s contention that
the case should . . . have been resolved in his favor as a matter of law.” 391 P.2d at 203.
11
381 U.S. 479.
12
The Griswold court reasoned, inter alia, that “specific guaranties in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guaranties that help give them life and substance. Those various
guaranties create zones of privacy.” Id. at 484. After discussing the specific amendments to the
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Eight years later, in Roe v. Wade,13 the Court extended this protection to a woman’s
decision to abort a fetus within the first trimester of pregnancy.14 Having been afforded
these new constitutional protections, parents were secured against having their claims for
wrongful birth denied based on the policy arguments advanced by the courts in
Christensen and Shaheen. As a result of Griswold and Roe, parties claiming injury as a
result of wrongful birth should no longer be denied a remedy at law.15
The rationale of the Griswold case contradicts the policy reasons advanced in
Shaheen for denying a cause of action for wrongful birth. In recognizing a couple’s right
to use contraception, the Court abrogated, as a matter of constitutional law, the concept
that procreation is the chief purpose of marriage. Furthermore, in its holding in Roe, the
Court, at least impliedly, recognized that not all women believe that the birth of a child is
a blessed event. It follows, therefore, that the “blessing” doctrine of Christensen can no
longer be maintained as a per se rule.

Constitution that give rise to this right of privacy, the Court stated that the intimate relation of husband and
wife is one lying within that zone. Id. at 486. It concluded that a law which forbids the “use of
contraceptives . . . has a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship” and cannot be upheld. Id.
13
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14
The Roe court introduced the issue by recognizing “the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion
controversy and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires.” Id. at 116. It
continued: “One’s philosophy, one’s experience . . . one’s religious training, one’s attitude toward life and
family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to
influence and color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion . . . our task, of course, is to resolve the
issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and predilection.” Id.
Realizing that the Constitution does not explicitly recognize a right to privacy, the Court cited
Griswold (see supra note 12) as having established one and maintained that “this right of privacy . . . is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 151.
(The remainder of the Court’s opinion deals with the competing interests of the woman and the state
regarding the lawfulness of abortion during the three trimesters of pregnancy.) For a full discussion and
analysis of the Roe decision and its subsequent impact, see HEYMANN AND BARZELAY, THE FOREST AND
THE TREES: ROE V. WADE AND ITS CRITICS,” 53 B.U.L. Rev. 765 (1963).
15
192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); 11 Pa.D. & C. 2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957). See also, supra note
5 and accompanying text. In adopting the right of privacy and applying it to contraception and abortion,
the Supreme Court did not discuss, nor did it intimate the relevance of its decision to the action for
wrongful birth..

4

Since the early 1970’s, claims for wrongful birth have met with increasing
success in the state courts.16 The litigation has arisen from a variety of factual situations.
Many of the successful actions have been brought by parents alleging that the physician’s
negligence prior to the conception of their child caused the injury.17 For instance,

16

See, e.g., Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169 (Ohio 2000); Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409
(R.I. 1977); Williams v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 688 N.E.2d 130 (Ill. 1977) (parents sought damages for
the birth of their child following a failed tubal ligation); Robak v. U.S., 658 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1981)
(parents of rubella syndrome child brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently failed
to diagnose mother’s rubella and inform her of possible damages to the fetus, and received damages for the
costs of raising and supporting the child); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. App. 1981) (parents
of unwanted, healthy child brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligent performance of
vasectomy on father and were denied costs for rearing the child); Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97
(D.D.C. 1982) (mother of unplanned child brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently
performed a laproscopic cauterization and was denied recovery for the costs of raising healthy child);
Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1980) (mother of unplanned, healthy child, brought
wrongful birth action against physician who negligently performed tubal ligation and was denied rearing
costs); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d 479 (1970) (parents brought action against
physician who negligently performed abortion and were precluded from recovering damages for costs
incurred in raising and educating the child); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977)
(parents of wrongfully born, healthy child, brought action against physician who negligently performed
sterilization operation and were awarded damages for the prenatal and postnatal expenses, mother’s pain
and suffering during pregnancy and delivery, loss of consortium and reasonable cost of rearing the
unplanned child subject to offset by the value of child’s aid, comfort and society); Bowman v. Davis, 356
N.E. 2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (parents of healthy child born as result of physician’s negligent performance of
tubal ligation brought suit and recovered costs for rearing); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W. 2d 372 (1975) (parents of child born with rubella syndrome brought wrongful birth action
against physician for negligently failing to diagnose mother’s condition and warn her of probable effects on
fetus, and recovered damages limited to expenses which parents had reasonably and necessarily suffered
and would suffer in the future due to the child’s deformities); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344
A.2d 336 (1975) (parents of healthy child brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligence in
performing a sterilization operation on mother and recovered damages for emotional upset, physical
inconvenience and costs incurred in rearing the child offset by any benefits that they might receive as a
result of the child’s birth); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W. 2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (suit for recovery of expenses
reasonably necessary for care and treatment of child who was born physically impaired because of mother’s
having contracted rubella is not barred by considerations of public policy); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.
2d 230, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 265 (1974) (action in malpractice lies by parents against physician for his negligent
failure to diagnose a pregnancy so that mother was prevented from aborting the child); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971) (benefits of an unwanted, healthy, child may be weighed against
all elements of damage claims by plaintiffs who had unplanned child as a result of pharmacist’s negligently
supplying tranquilizer rather than birth control pill).
17
In this type of situation, the claims have often been entitled “wrongful conception” or “wrongful
pregnancy” by the courts. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) and
Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A. 2d 747 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff’d., 349 A. 2d 8 (Del. 1975). Although
some commentators believe that the distinction in nomenclature is vital to a proper assessment of the issues
involved. See, e.g., Podewils, Lisa A, 73 B.U.Law Rev. 407 (May, 1993), n. 2 (“Wrongful conception or
wrongful pregnancy lawsuits may be distinguished from wrongful birth…actions. In wrongful birth
lawsuits, the parents of unhealthy infants seek to recover the cost of caring for the disabled infant.
Recovery is based on the premise that the parents would have aborted if they had known that the child was
going to be disabled, or that the child’s impairment was caused by the physician’s negligence….”), Note,
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physicians have been held liable for incorrectly performing a vasectomy18 or tubal
ligation.19 The action may also arise after a child has been conceived. Claims have been
brought against physicians for failing to diagnose a pregnancy or for failing to test for, or
diagnose, fetal defects in time for the mother to obtain a legal abortion.20
The spectrum of damages that have been claimed, awarded or denied is even
broader than that of the various forms of wrongful birth actions.21 Every court that has
heard a wrongful birth claim has discussed the multiple elements of possible damage and
the controversy over the proper calculation of damages.22 Although courts often purport

TORTS - CAUSE OF ACTION RECOGNIZED FOR WRONGFUL PREGNANCY - MEASURE OF DAMAGES TO BE
APPLIED, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 961 (March 1979)). Because the underlying issue involves ordinary common
law negligence, the distinction is of little or no value. It serves only to identify the temporary quality of the
negligence and is not relevant to a disposition of the underlying issue. As Dean Prosser has espoused, the
particular name a tort bears is of little relevance to the real issue of whether “the plaintiff’s interests are
entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant.” W. Prosser, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §1 at 3 (4th ed. 1971).
Additionally, unlike the characterization given to the different nomenclature by Podewils, causes
of action based on the concept of wrongful birth of a child born healthy, are abundant. See infra notes 100133 and accompanying text.
18
See, e.g, Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977). A vasectomy is a sterilization
procedure performed on a man, by which a section of the vas deferens, a tube which carries spermatoza, is
cut, and the severed ends sutured, thus preventing escape of sperm to a point where a male may impregnate
the female.
19
See, e.g., Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E. 2d 496 (Ohio 1976). A tubal ligation is a sterilization procedure by
which a woman’s fallopian tubes are cut and tied off as a means of preventing the union of sperm and egg.
20
See, e.g., Reick v. Medical Protective Co. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242 (1974); Jacobs v. Theimer,
519 S.W. 2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
21
See, e.g., infra note 24 and accompanying text.
22
See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981) (parents of unwanted, healthy child
brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligent performance of vasectomy on father and were
denied costs of rearing the child); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. App. 1981) (parents of
unwanted, healthy child brought wrongful birth action against physician for negligent performance of
vasectomy on father and were denied the costs of rearing the child); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla.
1981) (parents of deformed child brought action against physician based on negligent failure to diagnose
and warn of inheritable disease and recovered damages for medical expenses and extraordinary care
involved in treatment of child); Robak v. U.S., 658 F. 2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents of rubella syndrome
child brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently failed to diagnose mother’s rubella
and inform her of possible dangers to the fetus, and received damages for the costs of raising and
supporting the child); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E. 2d 968 (1981) (parents of
child wrongfully born as a result of negligent sterilization allowed to recover full costs of raising and
educating unplanned child); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W. 2d 209 (1981) (parents
of child born with genetic defect were entitled to seek damages for both medical expenses and mental
distress from physician who negligently failed to inform plaintiffs of fetus’ condition at stage where
abortion was legal); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D. 2d 180, 434 N.Y.S. 2d 300 (1980) (parents of wrongfully born,
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to allow recovery for those elements of damage that are a direct and probable result of the
defendant physician’s negligence,23 in actuality, most awards are not that far-reaching.24
The most controversial question concerning damages is whether to award the injured
parents costs of raising the unwanted child.25 In determining the extent of the parents’
injury, courts have focused on the health of the wrongfully born child. When the child is
born diseased or with an abnormality, courts have shown an increasing willingness to
award the plaintiff parents full compensation for the financial loss they will suffer for
raising a physically or mentally challenged child..26 However, in cases arising from the
unplanned birth of a healthy child, courts generally have refused to recognize the full
costs of rearing as a proper element of damages.27

healthy child can recover medical expenses as well as pain and suffering from physician or negligently
performed vasectomy, but costs for rearing denied as speculative and beyond reasonable measurement).
23
See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A. 2d 1003 (1982) and infra notes 100-112 and
accompanying text; Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 495 A.2d 883 (1982) and infra notes 134-149;
Robak v. U.S.., 658 F. 2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
24
Costs arising from the unsuccessful medical procedure and from the birth itself are most frequently
awarded. See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982) and infra notes 100-112;
Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.239, 628 S. W. 2d 568 (1982) and infra notes 113-125 and accompanying text;
Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. App. 1981). In addition, damages for pain and suffering
connected with the pregnancy, see, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W.Va. 1967), loss of the
mother’s wages due to the pregnancy. Id., and for the father’s loss of consortium during the wife’s absence
have also been allowed. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman
v. Davis, 356 N.E. 2d 496 (Ohio 1976). One court has held that the parents of a child born with birth
defects have a valid claim for damages resulting from emotional injury sustained as a result of the birth.
See, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (mental and emotional anguish parents have suffered
and will continue to suffer as the result of their Downs syndrome child is appropriate measure of damage).
25
See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d 479, 487 (the principal controversy in
negligent birth control actions revolves around the damage question).
26
See, e.g., Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406 (1982); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77 (1982) and infra notes
158-180 and accompanying text.
27
See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982) (no damages awarded for rearing);
Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982) (public policy bars the awarding of damages for rearing); Public
Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1980) (cost of raising a previously unwanted but healthy,
normal child is not recoverable element in wrongful birth cases). But, contra, see Cockrum v.
Baumgartner, 425 N.E. 2d 968 (Illinois, 1981) (costs of raising and educating unplanned child are proper
element of damages and rewards of parenthood should not be allowed in mitigation of rearing costs);
Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E. 2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (recovery for expense due to change in family status and
economic costs of rearing is not against public policy).
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Entering its adolescence as a cause of action, the wrongful birth claims’ validity
was recognized by an increasing number of courts.28 The courts were generally unable to

28

Successful wrongful birth cases since 1967 include Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A. 2d 1003
(1982) (parents of healthy child wrongfully born after negligent vasectomy recovered damages from
defendant physician for hospital and medical expenses, cost of sterilization, pain and suffering, loss of
mother’s wages and father’s consortium, but were denied costs for rearing); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.239,
628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982) (parents of an unwanted, healthy child brought suit against physician who
negligently and unsuccessfully performed vasectomy on father and were denied rearing costs on the basis
of public policy); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253,445 A. 2d 883 (1982) (parents of unplanned, healthy
child, recovered costs of rearing offset by value of child’s aid and comfort from physician who negligently
performed a tubal ligation); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77. 439 A. 2d 110 (1982) (parents of a genetically
defective child brought action against physician who negligently performed vasectomy and abortion
procedures and were awarded damages for expenses attributable to the birth and rearing of the child, mental
distress and physical inconvenience attributable to the child’s birth); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290
S.E. 2d 825 (1982) (parents of child born with Tay-Sach’s disease brought wrongful birth action against
physician who negligently failed to discover that fetus was affected with the disease, causing mother to
forego abortion, and recovered damages for care and treatment of child, and emotional distress); Robak v.
U.S., 658 F. 2d 8476 (7th Cir. 1981) (parents of rubella syndrome child brought wrongful birth action
against physician who negligently failed to diagnose mother’s rubella and inform her of possible damages
to the fetus, and received damages for the costs of raising and supporting the child); Maggard v. McKelvey,
627 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. App. 1981) (parents of unwanted, healthy child brought wrongful birth action against
physician for negligent performance of vasectomy on father and were denied costs for rearing); Harke v.
McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981) (mother of unplanned child brought wrongful birth action
against physician who negligently performed a laparoscopic cauterization and was denied recovery for the
costs of raising healthy child); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 so. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1980) (mother of
unplanned, healthy child brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently performed tubal
ligation and was denied rearing costs); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d 479 (1979)
(parents brought action against physician who negligently performed abortion and were precluded from
recovering damages for costs incurred in raising and educating the child); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (parents of wrongfully born, healthy, child brought action against physician
who negligently performed sterilization operation and were awarded damages for the prenatal and postnatal
expenses, mother’s pain and suffering during pregnancy and delivery, loss of consortium and reasonable
cost of rearing the unplanned child subject to offset by the value of child’s aid, comfort and society);
Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E. 2d 496 (Ohio 1976) (parents of healthy child born as result of physician’s
negligent performance of tubal litigation recovered costs for rearing); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hospital, 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W. 2d 372 (1975) ( parents of child born with rubella syndrome brought wrongful birth
action against physician for negligently failing to diagnose mother’s condition and warn her of probable
effects on fetus, and recovered damages limited to expenses which parents had reasonably and necessarily
suffered and would suffer in the future due to the child’s deformities); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J.
Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (parents of healthy child brought wrongful birth action against physician
for negligence in performing a sterilization operation on mother and recovered damages for emotional
upset, physical inconvenience and costs incurred in rearing the child offset by any benefits that they might
receive as a result of the child’s birth); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W. 2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (suit for recovery
of expenses reasonably necessary for care and treatment of child who was born physically impaired
because of mother’s having contracted rubella is not barred by considerations of public policy ); Ziemba v.
Sternberg, 45 A.D. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 265 (1974) (action in malpractice lies by parents against
physician for his negligent failure to diagnose a pregnancy so that mother was prevented from aborting the
child); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971) (benefits of an unwanted, healthy,
child may be weighed against all elements of damage claimed by plaintiffs who had unplanned child as
result of pharmacist’s negligently supplying tranquilizer rather than birth control pill); Custodio v. Bauer,
251 Cal. App. 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (in action to recover damages for the birth of a normal, healthy
child following failure of sterilization procedure, plaintiffs entitled to recover more than nominal damages);
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dismiss the suits on the grounds of public policy because of the decisions in Griswold and
Roe.29 However, in their lingering reluctance to recognize wrongful birth as a typical
negligence action, the courts continued to deny claimants complete recovery for the
injuries they suffered. In so doing, the courts left the parents of unwanted children with
an incomplete remedy and an echo of the resounding admonition of Christensen ringing
in their ear-instead of suffering an injury, you have been “blessed with the fatherhood of
another child.”30
This Article will trace the evolution of the cause of action for wrongful birth. It
will then study the development that wrongful birth has experienced, focusing first on
five successful wrongful birth cases handed down by state high courts during a seminal
year in the tort’s development.31 The stunted development of the cause of action since
then, including a number of state legislatures’ enacting laws denying the availability of
the tort to the citizens of their jurisdictions, and the continued misapplication of basic
principles of tort law by courts in states that do recognize this controversial cause of
action will be discussed. The legislative history of the Pennsylvania statute abrogating the
common law action for the tort of wrongful birth for its citizens will be analyzed.
Finally, the holdings and rationales of cases in the jurisdictions that do recognize the
cause of action shall be discussed, with an emphasis on the measure of damages. It will
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W.Va. 1967) (in an action brought by parents of child born as
result of negligently performed sterilization, whether wife suffered mental or physical pain from pregnancy
and subsequent Caesarean section presented disputed issues of fact which precluded grant of summary
judgment).
See infra, note 206 for additional cases.
29
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30
192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
31
Ochs v. Borelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A. 2d 883 (1982) see infra notes 134-149 and accompanying text;
Kingsbury v. Smith,122 N.H.237, 442 A. 2d 1003 (1982) see infra notes 100-112 and accompanying text;
Naccash v. Burger ,223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d 825 (1982), see infra notes 171-180 and accompanying text;
Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa.77, 439 A. 2d 110 (1981) (note that this case was actually handed down on 31
December 1981), see infra notes 158-170 and accompanying text; Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.
2d 568 (1982), see infra notes 113-125 and accompanying text.
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be demonstrated that though many courts have recognized the traditional tort nature of
wrongful birth, through indiscriminate application of basic postulates of damages rules or
under the guise of public policy, injured plaintiffs are nevertheless left with an
incomplete remedy or awarded damages beyond the scope of the defendant’s culpability.
This Article will conclude that although the cause of action for wrongful birth has
been denied both by some governors’ pens and the pens of some ultra-conservative
courts, it remains a valid cause of action in the majority of states. The courts that do hear
wrongful birth claims should shift the focus of their inquiry from the health of the
wrongfully born child to the plaintiffs’ reasons for deciding not to parent a child, in order
to award a remedy that is commensurate with the extent of the injury suffered.
I. THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
WRONGFUL BIRTH: A BLESSING EVOLVES INTO A BURDEN
The earliest claims for wrongful birth did not meet with success in the state
courts.32 In the first wrongful birth case on record, Christensen v. Thornby,33 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota was asked to hold a physician who failed to render the
plaintiff sterile after a vasectomy operation responsible for costs resulting from the
plaintiff’s wife’s subsequent pregnancy.34 The plaintiff in Christensen sought
sterilization because his wife had been advised to avoid a second pregnancy after having
experienced “great difficulty with the birth of her first child.”35 Recognizing that an
operation to sterilize a man whose wife may not have a child without grave hazard to her
32

See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) and Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D.
and C. 2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957). See, also, supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
33
192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
34
192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. at 621 (cause of action based not on medical malpractice but on deceit in the
representation by the physician to the effect that a sterilization operation would prevent conception by the
wife).
35
Id.

10

life, is consistent with public policy, the court looked to the purpose for which the
plaintiff underwent the surgery.36 It found that the purpose of the operation was “to save
the wife from the hazards to her life which were incident to childbirth,” and was not the
alleged purpose of saving the expenses incident to pregnancy and delivery.37 The court
reasoned that because the wife had survived, the husband had not been injured; rather, he
had been “blessed with the fatherhood of another child.”38 Furthermore, it maintained
that the “expenses alleged were incident to bearing the child, and their avoidance [was]
remote from the avowed purpose of the operation.”39
The issue of wrongful birth did not arise again (in a reported case) until 1957. In
Shaheen v. Knight,40 a Pennsylvania court voiced its agreement with Christensen that
sterilization procedures were not against public policy.41 However, the Shaheen court
held that where sterilization was ineffective, no compensable damage occurred when a
healthy child was subsequently born. The court denied the cause of action, asserting that
“to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal public
sentiment of the people.”42

36

192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. at 621-22. Inquiring into the purpose for which the sterilization was sought is
a valid method of determining the existence and extent of injury in wrongful birth actions. Unfortunately,
this method of inquiry was not employed again in a wrongful birth suit until it was adopted by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1981, in Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97. For a
discussion of Hartke and of the importance of ascertaining the plaintiff’s purpose in seeking sterilization
when awarding damages for wrongful birth, see infra notes 78-84 and1 191-193 and accompanying text.
37
192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. at 622.
38
Id.
39
192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. at 622 (court denied plaintiff’s action for deceit because plaintiff failed to
prove fraudulent intent). The Minnesota court later read Christensen as standing for the proposition that
although the plaintiff’s claim failed, a cause of action does exist for an improperly performed sterilization.
See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169, 172 (Minn. 1977), and infra notes 62-70 and
accompanying text.
40
11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
41
Id. at 43.
42
Id. at 45.
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Thus, at this point, there were two views on the cause of action for wrongful birth.
First, a cause of action existed, but unless the plaintiff could prove that his purpose in
seeking sterilization was frustrated by the subsequent birth, then as a matter of law no
damages were suffered, and indeed, a benefit accrued to the parents.43 The second
position was that no cause of action existed because the recognition of one would be
contrary to public policy because the birth of a child is a blessed event.44
Ten years after the Shaheen case was decided, a California appeals court declined
to adopt either of the two previously recognized views on wrongful birth, and espoused a
third view of what constituted an appropriate remedy in such actions. In Custodio v.
Bauer,45 the court held that if the plaintiffs could prove that sterilization was negligently
performed, and that the physician had breached his duty to them, they could recover all
damages proximately caused by the defendant physician’s negligence.46
The Custodio court’s departure from the persuasive authority of Christensen and
Shaheen must be examined in light of two intervening United States Supreme Court
cases. In Griswold v. Connecticut47and Roe v. Wade,48 the Court implicitly recognized
society’s changing attitude toward contraception and abortion. In Griwsold, the Court
asserted that the decision to use contraception is one of individual conscience, “clothed in
a cloak of constitutional protection.”49 Thus, the Custodio court had substantial support
for its rejection of Shaheen’s premise that procreation was the chief purpose of

43

See discussion of Christensen, infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
See discussion of Shaheen, infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text and Chriristnsen supra not 30 and
accompanying text.
45
251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
46
Id. at 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
47
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text for discussion of Griswold.
48
410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text for discussion of Roe.
49
381 U.S. 470. This language was quoted in Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 317-18, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 47273.
44
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marriage.50 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe clearly vitiated Christensen’s rationale
that the birth of a child is always a “blessed” event and illustrated that the Custodio court
was prescient. In dicta, the Roe court maintained
Maternity or additional offspring may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may
be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is
the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically or otherwise, to care for it.51
Therefore, the California court in Custodio had every reason to not mimic the positions of
other state courts that had dealt with the issue.52
In awarding plaintiff parents damages for all foreseeable consequences of a
negligently performed sterilization, including the costs of rearing the unplanned child,
Custodio added substance to the rights recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold and
Roe.53 However, Custodio has been criticized as representing the “extreme edge or
frontier” of allowable damages in a wrongful birth action.54 To prevent the plaintiff
parents from obtaining a financial windfall as a result of awarding them costs for raising
a healthy child, some courts have taken a fourth approach to wrongful birth and
completely denied that element of damages.55

50

See supra notes 12 and 14.
410 U.S. at 135.
52
See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
53
Custodio suggested that other foreseeable damages included the costs of the unsuccessful surgery, mental
distress and pain and suffering. 251 Cal App. 2d at 322, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
54
Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N. H. 237, 442 A. 2d 1003, 1005 (1982).
55
See, e.g., Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (KY. App. 1981); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App.
3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d 479 (1979); Bushman v. Burns Clinic, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W. 2d 683 (1978);
Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1980).
51

13

Two years after Custodio was decided, an Illinois appeals court, in Wilczynski v.
Goodman,56 allowed plaintiff parents to recover hospital and medical costs resulting from
a negligently performed abortion, but held that awarding costs for raising and educating a
normal, healthy child was against the legislatively declared policy of favoring childbirth
over abortion.57 Other courts have proffered different justifications in reaching that
result. For instance, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that rearing costs are not an
appropriate element of damages because such an award would exceed the negligent
physician’s culpability,58 and a Florida appeals court, in Public Health Trust v. Brown,59
resurrected the moribund argument of Shaheen v. Knight,60 maintaining that “a parent
cannot be said to have been damaged by the birth and rearing of a normal, healthy
child.”61
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, was unpersuaded that such public
policy considerations could properly be employed to deny parents of an unplanned child
recovery for wrongful birth.62 In Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,63 the Minnesota court
reasoned that an action for wrongful birth was analytically indistinguishable from an
ordinary medical malpractice action, and stated that, “[w]here the purpose of the
physician’s actions is to prevent conception or birth, elementary justice requires that he
be held legally responsible for the consequences which have in fact occurred.”64

56

73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d 479 (1979).
73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d at 487. The court reasoned that since the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975
(Ill. Rev. Stat., 1977, ch. 38, par. 81-21) strongly condemned abortion, “[t]he existence of a normal, healthy
life is an esteemed right under our laws rather than a compensable wrong.” Id.
58
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242 (1974).
59
Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1980).
60
11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
61
Brown at 1085.
62
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 174.
57
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Recognizing that it is “troublesome” to allow recovery of the costs of rearing a normal,
healthy child, the court nevertheless maintained that such costs are “a direct financial
injury to the parents.”65 It maintained that “although public sentiment may recognize that
to the vast majority of parents the long term and enduring benefits of parenthood
outweigh the economic costs of rearing a healthy child, it would seem myopic to declare
today that those benefits exceed the costs as a matter of law.”66
To effect its goal of compensating the plaintiff parents, the Minnesota court
adopted a fifth position with respect to damages for wrongful birth. The court allowed
damages for rearing the unplanned child, but offset the award by an amount equal to the
benefits conferred upon the parents as a result of the child’s birth.67 The court asserted
that a computation of rearing costs would include an assessment of projected expenses
for maintaining, supporting and educating the child during its minority.68 This amount
would then be reduced by the value of the benefits the parents would receive as a result
of the child’s aid, comfort and society.69 The court concluded that this procedure should
be coupled with “strict judicial scrutiny of verdicts” in order to prevent excessive
awards.70

65

Id. at 175.
Id. The court recognized that family planning is not only an “integral aspect of the modern marital
relationship,” but that decisions such as Roe and Griswold have clothed the right to limit procreation with
constitutional protection. Id.
67
Id. at 176. The court did not discuss its reasons for declining to follow the Custodio approach (see supra
note 45 and accompanying text), but merely concluded that the position it adopted was more “refined.”
260 N.W. 2d at 173).
68
Id. at 176. The court noted that “[s]hould the unplanned child be born with congenital deformities, the
parental support obligation could extend beyond the date that the child reaches his majority.” Id.
69
Id. The court recognized that the dollar value of these benefits would be difficult to measure, but
analogized this situation to wrongful death, in which damages for loss of aid, comfort and society are
routinely awarded. Id.
70
Id. The court also mandated that all actions for wrongful birth be submitted to the jury with a special
verdict form with explanatory instructions, to assist them in measuring the complex elements of damage.
Id.
66
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Six years prior to the Minnesota court’s decision in Sherlock, a Michigan appeals
court developed this reduction method with the goal of preventing excessive awards to
plaintiff parents.71 In contrast to Sherlock’s position, however, the Michigan court in
Troppi v. Scarf,72 maintained that the reduction method itself would obviate the
possibility of creating windfall verdicts. It posited that because there was a diversity of
purposes for which women employ contraception, and the consequences arising from
negligent interference with such use vary widely from case to case,73 “[a] rational legal
system must award damages that correspond with these different injuries.”74 The court
concluded that a system that allows parents of a wrongfully born child to recover rearing
costs, offset by the value of benefits conferred upon them as a consequence of the birth,
and life, of a healthy child would serve to accomplish that purpose.75
The Michigan court’s decision in Troppi has been praised by other courts as the
most logical means to achieve an equitable result when the parents seek the costs of
rearing an unplanned child.76 However, ten years after Troppi, the United States District

71

Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
Id. The plaintiffs in Troppi brought suit against a pharmacist who negligently substituted tranquilizers
for birth control pills when filling the plaintiff’s prescription.
73
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d at 518. The court offered as examples of contraceptive users the
“unmarried women who seek the pleasure of sexual intercourse without the perils of unwed motherhood,
married women who wish to delay slightly the start of a family in order to retain the career flexibility which
many young couples treasure, and married women for whom the birth of a child would pose a threat to their
own health or the financial security of their families.” Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. The court queried: “Is it not likely that an unwed college student who becomes pregnant due to a
pharmacist’s failure to fill properly her prescription for oral contraceptives has suffered far greater damage
than the young newlywed who, although her pregnancy arose from the same sort of negligence had planned
the use of contraception only temporarily, say, while she and her husband took an extended honeymoon
trip?” It concluded that without this reduction method, “both plaintiffs would be entitled to recover
substantially the same damages.” Id. The court stressed that the “trier of fact must have the power to
evaluate the benefit according to all the circumstances of the case presented.” It suggested that family size
and income, parental age and marital status were some of the factors that should be considered “in
determining the extent to which the birth of a particular child represents a benefit to its parents.” Id.
76
See, e.g., Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33
Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976).
72
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Court for the District of Columbia declined to employ that rationale.77

In Hartke v.

McKelway,78 the district court was asked to determine whether a woman who gave birth
to an unplanned, healthy child as the result of a negligently performed sterilization, could
recover costs for raising the child.79 To ascertain the extent of injury resulting from the
child’s birth, the Hartke court also looked to the purpose for which the plaintiff had
sought sterilization.80 However, in contrast to the Troppi court’s approach, the Hartke
court did not employ the reduction method in calculating damages. Rather, it maintained
that a determination of the purpose itself should be the controlling factor in awarding
damages commensurate with the injury suffered.81 The court found that the plaintiff had
undergone sterilization for the purpose of avoiding possible medical complications from
delivering another child;82 it was not her purpose to avoid the expenses of raising a
child.83 The court held that the defendant’s “wrong against the plaintiff consisted [only]
in imposing the pain, suffering and mental anguish of pregnancy on her, not in imposing
the [financial] costs of a healthy child,” and thus denied the plaintiff’s claim for rearing
costs.84
Hartke provides a rational method for determining damages as a function of the
specific injury the parents had attempted to avoid. Its approach had not been used

77

Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981).
Id.
79
Id. at 104.
80
In making this determination, the court followed the analysis offered by the Minnesota court in
Christensen v. Thornby, the first wrongful birth case. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. The
plaintiff in Hartke sought sterilization because she had previously suffered an ectopic pregnancy (a
pregnancy in which gestation occurs elsewhere than in the uterus) and “feared for her life should she
become pregnant again.” 526 F. Supp. at 99.
81
Hartke at 105. For a similar viewpoint, see Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
78
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before.85 Instead, other courts had concentrated on the result of the wrongful birth, rather
than on the purpose the plaintiffs sought to protect in their decision not to bear and parent
a child.
The issue that has proved determinative in this outcome-oriented approach is the
physical health of the child. When the child is born normal and healthy, the courts have
engaged in discussions of the “blessings”86 and “benefits”87 of parenthood, and have
allowed those concepts either to abrogate the plaintiff’s claim or reduce an award of
damages for rearing.88 However, if the wrongfully born infant is born with a congenital
defect, courts have generally rejected these arguments.89 For example, in 1981, in Robak
v. U.S.,90 the parents of a child born with rubella brought a wrongful birth action against
their physician, alleging that he had negligently failed to diagnose the pregnant mother’s
rubella and inform her of possible injury to the fetus.91 The parents, claiming that they
would have terminated the pregnancy had they known of the effects of the mother’s
rubella, sought damages for past and future maintenance and care of the child.92 The
court ruled that an action for wrongful birth is governed by ordinary tort principles.
Since it is a fundamental tenet of tort law that a negligent tortfeasor is liable for all

85

The single exception is Christensen v. Thornby. See, supra note 80.
See, supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
87
Id..
88
See infra notes 100-114 and accompanying text.
89
See, e.g., Eisenbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W. 2d 209 (1981) (parents of child born
with genetic defects brought wrongful birth action against physician who negligently deprived them of
information which would have led them to terminate pregnancy); Moores v. Lucas, 405 so. 2d 1022 (Fla.
1981) (parents brought wrongful birth action against obstetrician for failure to diagnose or warn of
inheritable disease which resulted in birth of deformed child); Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W. 2d 372 (1975) (parents of child born with rubella syndrome brought wrongful birth action
against physician who negligently failed to diagnose mother’s rubella so that she could obtain an abortion
during first trimester of pregnancy).
90
658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981). The court noted that this was a case of first impression for a federal court
of appeals.
91
Id..
92
Id.
86
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damages that are the proximate result of his negligence,”93 the court held that the
plaintiffs could recover damages for rearing the child, and that the award was not subject
to any reduction.94
Thus, it is apparent that wrongful birth had experienced two separate and
independent paths of development. By 1981, the parents of a child wrongfully born with
a congenital disease were generally secure in establishing rearing costs as a proper
element of damages.95 At the same time, however, the parents of a child wrongfully
born, normal and healthy, were more likely to have that element of damages denied.96

II. A SEMINAL YEAR FOR THE BLEMISHED ADOLESCENCE OF A MATURING
TORT: CONTINUING A TRADITION OF CONTROVERSY AND CONFUSION
Five wrongful birth cases, each of first impression, were decided by state courts
of last resort in 1982,97 the most important period in the development of this controversial
cause of action. The factual scenarios presented by these cases typify those that had been
encountered by other state courts.98 It is apparent that the courts have continued the
tradition of focusing the inquiry in wrongful birth actions on the health of the child, rather
than inquiring into the reasons behind the plaintiffs’ decision not to parent a child.99 The

93

Id. at 478 (emphasis by the court).
Id. at 479.
95
See, supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
96
See, infra notes 100-133 and accompanying text.
97
Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 256-7, 445 A.2d 883 (1982), see infra notes 134-149 and accompanying
text; Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H.237, 442 A. 2d 1003 (1982) see infra notes 104-112 and accompanying
text; Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.239, 628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982), see infra notes 113-117 and accompanying
text; Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d 825 (1982), see infra notes 171-180 and accompanying
text; Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A. 2d 110 (1981), see infra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
98
See, e.g., Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. Am. 1981) (child born as a result of negligently
performed bilateral vasectomy); Pierce v. Piver, 262 S.E. 2d 320 (N.C. App. 1980) (child born after
negligent performance of a tubal ligation); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1981) (physician’s
failure to diagnose or warn of inheritable disease caused mother to forego abortion).
99
See, e.g., Kingnsbury v. Smith: “The ruling today is limited to the facts of this case, involving a faulty
sterilization procedure that resulted in the birth of a healthy child. Other and differing circumstances,
94
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five cases of 1982 illustrate the controversy among and confusion among the courts
concerning the proper measurement of damages for wrongful birth.
A. Denial of Damages for Rearing A Healthy Child
In Kingsbury v. Smith100 and Wilbur v. Kerr,101 the Supreme Courts of New
Hampshire and Arkansas, respectively, were asked to recognize claims for wrongful birth
and award damages resulting therefrom. Both cases involved the birth of a normal,
healthy child following unsuccessful sterilization procedures.102 In determining that the
plaintiff parents had stated a cause of action, both courts adopted rationales previously
espoused by other state courts that had dealt with the issue of wrongful birth.103
In Kingsbury v. Smith, the defendant, Dr. Thompson, performed a tubal ligation
on the plaintiff mother, Mrs. Kingsbury, after she gave birth to her third child. Eighteen
months following that surgery, Mrs. Kingsbury gave birth to her fourth healthy child. In
response to this unplanned birth, the Kingsburys filed a wrongful birth action against the
defendant.104

including but not limited to the birth of an abnormal or injured child might lead us to a different
conclusion.” 122 N.H. 237 at 243 (1982).
100
122 N.H.237 (1982).
101
628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982).
102
In Kingsbury, the plaintiff mother had undergone surgery for a tubal ligation, 122 N.H. at 238, and in
Wilbur, the plaintiff father suffered two unsuccessful vasectomies. 628 S.W. 2d at 569.
103
See notes 100-112 for the approach taken by the Kingsbury court, and notes 113-125 for that taken in
Wilbur.
104
122 N.H. at 240. After the birth of her fourth child, Dr. Thompson was again requested to undertake
further sterilization procedures and did so. The parents then filed this diversity action in the United States
District Court of New Hampshire. This case came to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire from a
certification of questions concerning whether New Hampshire recognizes a claim for wrongful birth, and if
so, what damages may be considered by the trier of fact.

20

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire first elected to construe this action for
wrongful birth as an action for wrongful conception.105 The court recognized, implicitly,
that the case presented a cause of action based on negligence.106 The justices reiterated
that at common law, remedies are provided for persons injured by conduct of another that
breaches a duty owed them.107 Realizing that the issue of damages is often problematic
in suits for wrongful birth, the court opined: “[T]he outlines of the duty are [often] more
apparent than the remedy that society chooses to provide. Such is the case at hand.”108
The court surveyed the different legal positions advanced by other state courts
when confronted with the wrongful birth issue,109 and ultimately held that the proper

105

122 N.H. at 240. The court provided no rationale for this distinction. See supra note 17 for a definition
of wrongful conception.
106
The court did not mention the word negligence at the outset of its opinion. However, in its discussion of
risk, duty and injury, it introduced the concept of negligently inflicted harm. For a discussion of these
elements, see infra notes 107 and 255.
107
122 N.H at 238.
As with any cause of action based on negligence, a successful wrongful birth claim requires an
initial demonstration by the parent plaintiffs that the defendant physician owed them a legal duty. Duty is a
legally recognized obligation to conform to a specific standard of conduct toward another. W. Prosser,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, §53, 324 (4TH ED., 1971). A physician is under a duty to provide his
patients with professional medical care, Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 110 (1979), a standard that is
defined as that “degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by practitioners of the medical profession
in the same locality.” Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (1967). Although the degree of learning
and skill often varies from one locality to another, all physicians are required to exercise ordinary care in
applying those skills that they do possess. In the context of a wrongful birth action, the physician is
charged with using due care when performing a sterilization operation, an abortion, or when diagnosing a
mother or her fetus for disease or abnormalities. If the physician fails to conform to the applicable standard
of due care, the duty owed the patient is breached. Thus, in failing to successfully perform a tubal ligation
or in misdiagnosing the health of a fetus, a physician commits such a breach.
108
122 N.H. 237, 442 A. 2d at 1004.
109
The court cited Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), for the propositions that a
recovery for wrongful birth is unwarranted because the damages are unforeseeable and remote and that the
birth of a child is always a “blessing.” However, the New Hampshire court ultimately rejected this
position, stressing that “nonrecognition of any cause of action for wrongful conception leaves a void in the
area of recovery for medical malpractice and dilutes the standard of professional conduct and expertise in
the area of family planning.” 122 N.H.237, 442 A.2d at 1005.
The Kingsbury court viewed Custodio v. Bauer, see supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text, as
presenting the “extreme edge or frontier” of the different positions courts have taken with respect to
wrongful birth claims. 122 N.H .237, 442 A.2d at 1005. The Custodio court awarded the plaintiffs the
costs of raising a child, thereby fully compensating them for the injury they suffered as a result of the
physician’s negligence. See supra notes 45-55 and infra notes 328-331 and accompanying text. The New
Hampshire court discredited Custodio’s rationale that wrongful birth was “analytically indistinguishable
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elements of damage were those that were a direct and probable result of the defendant’s
negligence. Nevertheless, the court limited the recovery to the cost of sterilization and
the medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost wages caused by the pregnancy, and
denied the plaintiffs costs for rearing.110 It concluded that this was the most logical and
humane view because it allowed parents to recover without granting them a windfall or
placing an unreasonable burden on the negligent physician.111
Curiously, the Kingsbury court did not set forth a rationale in support of its
position that allowing rearing costs would grant a windfall to the defendant; nor did it
proffer any justification for its desire to insulate the negligent physician from liability
coextensive with his culpability. The court merely concluded that rearing costs were not
a proper element of damage in a wrongful birth action.112 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas reached the same conclusion as Kingsbury, but was less reticent in its reasoning

from an ordinary medical malpractice action.” Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472, on the
basis that “in no other situation is a new human life created.” Kingsbury, 122 N.H. 237, 442 2d at 1006.
The third position the Kingsbury court studied was that first taken by the Michigan Supreme Court
in 1971 in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971), see supra 71-76 and
accompanying text. The Kingsbury court strenuously rejected the theory that recovery for the reasonably
foreseeable costs of raising the child should be allowed, but offset by an amount equal to the value of the
benefits conferred to the parents as a result of the child’s birth, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d at ?, as an
illogical attempt to “reduce the magnitude of verdicts and lessen the monetary shock to the medical
tortfeasor.” 122 N.H. 237, 442, A.2d at 1006. The New Hampshire court reasoned that a benefit cannot be
reaped “from the total failure of the medical service or treatment giving rise to the action.” Id. (Note that
the benefits rule is actually section 920, Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts. For a discussion of section
920 as it relates to the cause of action for wrongful birth, see infra notes 319-343 and accompanying text.)
The Kingsbury court completed its survey by adopting the approach pronounced by the Illinois
court in Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d 479 (1979), see supra notes 56-57 and
accompanying text. In Wilczynski, the parents of an unplanned child brought a wrongful birth action
against their physician alleging that he negligently failed to perform a successful abortion. 73 Ill, App. 3d
51, 391 N.E. 2d at 481. They sought, inter alia, compensation for the costs they would incur in raising the
child. The Illinois court denied the plaintiff parents the costs of rearing for reasons of public policy. (The
court based its argument on the state legislature’s policy favoring birth over abortion. The Illinois Abortion
Act of 1975 sanctions abortions “where necessary to preserve the life of the mother.” Il. Rev. Stat. 1977,
ch. 38, par. 81-21. The court construed this statute as a “strong condemnation of abortion and support of
the right to life.” 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d at 487.)
110
122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d at 1006.
111
Id.
112
Id.
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than was the New Hampshire court. In Wilbur v. Kerr,113 the Arkansas court was asked
to determine whether the parents of a healthy child born following the negligent
performance of a vasectomy on the plaintiff, could recover the expenses of raising the
child from the tort-feasing physician..114
Recognizing that most courts agree that wrongful birth is a valid cause of action
grounded in tort, but disagreeing on the appropriate remedy,115 the Wilbur court surveyed
the various policy reasons advanced for denying recovery for the expenses of raising the
unwanted child.116 It was persuaded by the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rationale in its
first disposition of a wrongful birth case.117 In Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,118 the
Wisconsin court, presented with a claim that the defendant physician had failed to
determine that the plaintiff mother was pregnant in time for her to obtain a lawful
abortion, denied damages for raising the unplanned child based on the rationale that such
an award would shift the financial responsibility of the child to the physician, while all
other responsibilities remained with the natural parents. This, the courts concurred,
would create a new and unwarranted category of surrogate parents.119 The Wilbur court
maintained also that shifting the costs of rearing would have damaging effects on the
child himself. According to the Arkansas court, the child would be made to feel, like an
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275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982).
275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W. 2d at 569.
115
Id.
116
The court was unpersuaded by a Texas appeals court’s rationale, in Terrel v. Garcia, 496 S.W. 2d 124
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (negligent sterilization wrongful birth suit), that the benefits of raising a healthy
child completely outweigh the financial burden suffered by the parents. Wilbur, 275 Ark. 239-, 628 S.W.
2d at 670, citing Terrell at 126. (The Terrel court based its reasoning on the “blessing” doctrine of
Christensen v. Thornby. It declared: “Who can place a price tag on a child’s smile or the parental pride in
a child’s achievements? Rather than attempt to value these intangible benefits, our courts have simply
determined that public sentiment recognizes that these benefits to the parents outweigh their economic loss
in rearing and educating a healthy, normal child.” 496 S.W. 2d. at 128.).
117
Wilbur, 275 Ark.239, 628 S.W. 2d at 570.
118
64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 568 (1974).
119
Id.
114
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“emotional bastard” -- a child who will someday learn that he was unwanted because his
rearing was paid for by another.120 Realizing that several courts had awarded plaintiff
parents expenses for rearing the unplanned child, the Wilbur court maintained that in
treating the issue as one of ordinary damages, the recovery was logical.121 It queried:
“Should parents in this sophisticated day and time not have a right to plan their family
and avoid the economic hardship of raising a child they chose not to have? Should the
doctor not pay for all the damages occasioned by his negligent act?”122 However, the
Arkansas court declined to answer these questions in the affirmative and consequently
denied the parent’s claim for damages for the expenses incurred in raising the wrongfully
born child, asserting that such a recovery would “undermine society’s need for a strong
and healthy family relationship.”123 The Wilbur court held that the negligent physician
was responsible for his act, but limited that responsibility to “any and all proper damages
connected with the operation and . . . the pregnancy.”124 Thus, Arkansas joined a
majority of jurisdictions that do not recognize rearing costs as an element of damages in a
wrongful birth action.125
120

Wilbur, 275 Ark.239, 628 S.W. 2d. at 570.
See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E. 2d 968 (1981); Bowman v. Davis, 48
Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E. 2d 496 (1976).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 571.
124
Id. The Wilbur court also raised the issue of whether a parent should be asked to mitigate damages by
aborting or offering the child for adoption. However, the court dismissed this issue, stating that most courts
have rejected the application of the principle of mitigation in wrongful birth actions. Id.
125
Other jurisdictions that have denied parent plaintiffs recovery for rearing costs include Kentucky,
Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (1981) (parents of unwanted, healthy, child brought wrongful birth
action against physician for negligent performance of vasectomy); Florida, Public Health Trust v. Brown,
388 So. 2d 1084 (1980) (mother of unplanned, healthy child brought wrongful birth action against
physician who negligently performed tubal ligation); New York, Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D. 2d 180, 434
N.Y.S. 2d 300 (1980) (parents of unplanned, healthy, child born as the result of a negligently performed
vasectomy brought wrongful birth action against physician); Michigan, Bushman v. Burns Clinic, 83 Mich.
App. 453, 268 N.W. 2d 683 (1978) (Patient and wife brought action against physician to recover for
wrongful birth resulting from negligence in performing vasectomy).
Focusing on this issue of damages, two members of the Arkansas court in Wilbur dissented,
asserting that they disagreed with the majority’s invocation of public policy for the purpose of denying
121
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Both the Kingsbury and Wilbur courts relied substantially on policy reasons for
their ultimate conclusions that rearing costs were not a proper element of damages in
wrongful birth actions. While the Wilbur court mentioned the interests it was attempting
to promote126 and the Kingsbury court made a cryptic reference to the policy that it
believed outweighed the parents’ right to be compensated for raising the unplanned
child,127 neither court focused attention directly on the economic loss that plaintiff
parents in wrongful birth actions would sustain as a result of these narrow rulings.
Through an invocation of public policy, both courts indirectly reasoned that costs for
rearing were not a proper remedy because of the possibility of burdening the physician128
or emotionally damaging the child,129 but evaded the basic question of why the parents of
the unplanned child, instead of the negligent physician, should sustain the financial
burden of raising that child. The dissent in Wilbur realized that this economic issue
deserved greater attention.130 It, therefore, suggested that rather than invoking public
policy, the court should allow a jury to award rearing costs, but offset that award by an
amount equal to the benefits the parents would derive as a result of raising the child.131

proper application of the common law rules of tort damages. 275 Ark.239 at 244, 628 S.W. 2d at 572. The
dissent argued that the court was subtly promoting a public policy that encourages abortion or adoption by
disallowing damages for raising the child. Id. It concluded by concurring with those courts that have
adopted the theory of full recovery offset by any benefits though the parents derived from raising the
unplanned child. Id. See, e.g.,, Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977). See also
infra notes 319-331 and accompanying text.
126
See, supra note 123 and accompanying text.
127
See, supra note 109.
128
Kingsbury, 122 N.H.237, 442 A. 2d at 1003.
129
Wilbur, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W. 2d at 571.
130
628 S.W. 2d at 572. The dissent stated, in part: “The compensation is not for the so-called unwanted
child or ‘emotional bastard’ but to replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival will not deprive
the other members of the family of what was planned as their fair share of the family income.” Id, citing
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
131
628 S.W. 2d at 572.
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This offsetting benefits rule has been met with judicial approval in other states,132 and
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut three months after the Arkansas court
decided Wilbur.133

B. The Benefits Rule: A Balancing Test to Offset an Award of Rearing
Costs
In Ochs v. Borrelli,134 the Connecticut Supreme Court was confronted with the
wrongful birth issue and was asked to determine, inter alia, whether the parents of a child
conceived after a negligently performed sterilization may be compensated by the
negligent physician for the costs of rearing.135 The defendant, having admitted to being
negligent,136 argued that public policy required the court to hold that a child is always a
blessing to its parents, and that this benefit must as a matter of law totally offset any
concomitant financial burden.137 The court, noting that this was a case of first
impression, began reviewing the state of the law by citing various other courts that had
dealt with this issue.138 Determined that public policy should not create an exception “to
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See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Stills vs. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
133
The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted this rule in Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d .883, in
June of 1982.
134
187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982).
135
The issue of whether the trial court’s award of damages for medical expenses and pain and suffering
occasioned by the unsuccessful sterilization was excessive, was also raised on appeal. The court discussed
the plaintiff mother’s claim that she suffered months of severe physical discomfort, numerous painful
medical procedures and serious emotional distress throughout her pregnancy, and determined that the
award was not excessive. Id. at 261.
136
The defendant physician, Dr. Borrelli, admitted his negligence and limited his appeal to the proper
measurement of damages. Id. at 255.
137
Id. at 256.
138
The court cited Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975);
Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E. 2d 479 (1979); and Reick v. Medical Protective Co.,
64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242 (1974), as courts that have completely denied rearing costs when
awarding damages in wrongful birth actions. It cites Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E. 2d 968 (1981); and Sherlock v.
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the normal duty of a tortfeasor to assume liability for all the damages that he has
proximately caused,”139 and intent upon protecting the exercise of the rights of privacy
adopted in Griswold and Roe,140 the Ochs court awarded the parents the expenses of
rearing the unplanned child offset by the value of the benefits conferred on the parents by
having the child.141 The court, however, did not provide any guidelines for the trier of
fact to employ when attempting to determine the value of those benefits.
The defendant argued that allowing any recovery for the costs of raising the child
would “erroneously equate the birth of a child with an injury to its parents.”142 The
Connecticut court rejected this assertion. Maintaining that parents are often recompensed
for their economic expenditures incurred in raising a child through the intangible rewards
that the experience brings, the court nevertheless emphasized that the expense of rearing
is often injurious because of the financial burden it imposes. It stated: “parental pleasure
softens, but does not eradicate economic reality.”143
The Ochs court emphasized that it was not shifting the entire economic burden of
parenthood to the negligent physician.144 Specifically, the ruling in Ochs requires the
trier of fact to weigh the intangible benefits of having a child against the financial costs
that are incurred in raising that child. Once the benefits are calculated, they are to be
used to offset the expenses and, therefore, to reduce the negligent physician’s liability.145

Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Minn. 1977) as courts that have allowed parents to recover child
rearing expenses.
139
187 Conn. at 258.
140
For a discussion of the holdings in Griswold and Roe, see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
141
Ochs at 259. See also, Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.3d 1 (1990) and infra notes 218-225 and
accompanying text.
142
Id.
143
Ochs at 259.
144
Id. See also infra notes 314-348 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule of offsetting
benefits.
145
187 Conn. at 260.
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The Connecticut court declined to offer any methodology to assist the jury in balancing
these factors.146 It did, though, defend its balancing test against the defendant’s
contention that it involved impermissible speculation.147 Realizing that this test required
the jury to balance economic factors against non-economic factors, the court maintained
that the weighing was no more speculative than the process used by courts in determining
damages for wrongful death.148 Thus, the court asserted that the balancing test was not
impermissibly speculative.149
The Ochs court’s adoption of a balancing test to offset the award of rearing costs
to parents of an unplanned child aligned Connecticut with the minority of jurisdictions
that had dealt with wrongful birth claims.150 This approach, unlike that taken by the New
Hampshire court in Kingsbury151 and the Arkansas court in Wilbur,152 focuses on the
economic factors involved in wrongful birth. However, irrespective of its more equitable
approach, the Connecticut court failed to completely compensate the plaintiff parents for
the financial burden incurred as a direct and proximate result of the defendant physician’s
negligence. In so doing Connecticut joined the majority of jurisdictions that have been
challenged by wrongful birth claims involving the birth of a healthy child.153

146

For a discussion of this balancing test, see infra notes 314-338 and accompanying text.
Ochs at 259-60.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
The majority of courts that have adjudicated wrongful birth claims have denied recovery for costs of
rearing. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Other jurisdictions that have recognized the offsetting
balancing test include Michigan, Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971); Minnesota,
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d. 169 (Minn. 1977); and California, Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1976).
151
See, supra notes 100-112 and accompanying text.
152
See supra notes 113-125 and accompanying text.
153
See supra notes 125 and 150 for other jurisdictions in accord.
147
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Courts deciding wrongful birth claims involving infants born with a disease or
abnormality, however, have shown a greater willingness to award the parent plaintiffs
costs for raising an unplanned or unwanted child. 154

C. Awarding Full Compensation: Rearing Costs Allowed For Abnormal Children
In cases of first impression, the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Virginia, in
Speck v. Finegold 155 and Naccash v. Burger,156 respectively, allowed the parents of
wrongfully born and genetically defective children to recover child rearing costs from the
physician whose negligence caused the birth.157
In Speck v. Finegold, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was introduced to the
wrongful birth cause of action under a compelling set of facts.158 The plaintiffs were the
parents of two children who inherited a defect of the genes that caused them to be born
with neurofibromatosis.159 For genetic and economic reasons, the plaintiffs decided not
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See, e.g., Robak v. U.S., 658 F. 2d 471 (1981). See also infra notes 158-180 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the rationales proffered by the Pennsylvania and Virginia courts in holding the defendant
physician liable for rearing costs.
155
497 Pa.77, 438 A.2d 117 (1981)
156
223 Va .406, 290 S.E. 2d 825 (1982)
157
497 Pa. 77, 439 A. 2d 117; 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d 825. (Note that the Speck decision from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since been rendered moot by the Pennsylvania legislature’s enactment of
a statute disallowing any cause of action for wrongful birth. See 42 Pa.C.S. sec. 8305(a) and infra notes
199-205 and accompanying text.
158
The court was also asked to determine whether Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action for
wrongful life. The court, evenly divided on the issue, affirmed the Order of the Superior Court that the
infant plaintiff’s cause of action was not legally cognizable. 497 Pa. 77, 439 A. 2d 117. For a discussion
of wrongful life and why it has met with judicial disfavor, see supra note 1.
159
Neurofibromatosis (von Ricklinghausen’s Disease) is a disease resulting from a hereditary defect, due to
an autosomal dominant gene, characterized by developmental changes in the nervous system, muscles,
bones and skin. Skin changes vary from trivial (Café au lait spots) to extremely disfiguring. The condition
is marked superficially by the formation of many pedunculated sort tumors (neurofibromas); however,
neurofibromas are also found on cranial nerves and nerve roots. Bilateral acoustic (organs of hearing)
neurofibromata (tumors on tumors) occasionally complicate neurofibromatosis in children. Bone changes
often result. Neurofibromata are benign and malignant change is rare. Yet, in the central nervous system
malignant tumors may appear, the most common of which is glioma of the optic nerve. The condition is
both congenital and heredofamilial (inherited by more than one member of a family). The clinical course is
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to parent other children. Mr. Speck engaged the defendant, Dr. Finegold, to perform a
vasectomy on him. However, after the operation was performed, Mrs. Speck became
pregnant. Mrs. Speck then requested the other defendant, Dr. Schwartz, to terminate her
pregnancy. After the operation, Mrs. Speck informed Dr. Schwartz of her belief that she
was still pregnant, but she was assured that the pregnancy had been aborted. Four
months after her surgery, Mrs. Speck gave birth to a daughter who also inherited
neurofibromatosis. One year later, the Specks filed their suit.160
In addressing the issue of wrongful birth, the Pennsylvania court asserted that a
disposition of the claim requires “the extension of existing principles of tort law to new
facts.”161 Based on this premise the Speck court maintained that common law principles
of damage apply and that the physician is responsible for the “natural and probable
consequences of his misconduct.”162
The defendants, however, asserted that “because the public policy of the
Commonwealth favors birth over abortion, the approval of such a cause of action would
be in contravention of legislatively declared policy.”163 The court rejected this argument,
holding that recognition of this cause of action merely affords the victims of negligently
performed sterilization or abortion procedures the same legal protection guaranteed to
victims of other forms of medical malpractice, without having affecting abortion activity
within Pennsylvania.164

variable, making prognosis at any given time difficult. There is no known treatment or cure for the disease.
497 Pa. 77, 438 A. 2d at 112. (Footnote by the court; citations omitted.).
160
497 Pa. 77, 439 A. 2d at 112..
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. In addition, the Speck court argued that the denial of a wrongful birth cause of action would vitiate
the constitutional protection afforded abortion by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410
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The court maintained that if no duty were imposed on physicians in this area, the
fundamental principles of tort law-compensating the victim, deterring negligence and
encouraging due care, would be frustrated.165 Unwilling to grant an “unjustifiable and
unfair windfall to the defendants” and allow them to escape liability for the substantial
injuries they negligently caused the plaintiffs, the court held that the plaintiffs could
recover expenses resulting from the birth of and raising of their daughter.166 In addition,
the court allowed recovery for the mental distress and physical inconvenience suffered by
the parents as a result of their daughter’s wrongful birth.167
In its determination that the parents of a wrongfully born and abnormal child can
recover rearing costs from the negligent physician, the Speck court denied the defendant’s
argument that public policy contravened such an award.168 In refusing to invoke public
policy to insulate the negligent physician from liability for his tort, the Speck court
resolved the wrongful birth issue solely on the basis of common law principles of
damages.169 In so doing, the Pennsylvania court joined a growing minority of
jurisdictions that fully compensate the plaintiff parent in wrongful birth actions.170

U.S. 113 (1973), by denying a remedy to a victim who is injured as a result of fulfilling her right. (See
supra note 14 for a discussion of Roe.).
165
Speck, 439 A. 2d at 112.
166
Id.
167
Id. In a concurring opinion, one justice agreed that public policy had absolutely no relevance to the
question of wrongful birth. He stated that “nothing about sterilization or abortion requires the application
of legal principles different from those controlling in other medical malpractice actions.” (Kauffman, J.,
concurring). Id. The sole dissenter insisted that because wrongful birth was an action that involved the
creation of a new human life, the court could not recognize it as a tort and must defer the issue to the
legislature. (Nix, J., dissenting). Id.
168
See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text for the court’s rationale.
169
497 Pa. 77, 439 A. 2d at 118 (concurring opinion of Kauffman, J.).
170
See, e.g., Robak v. U.S., 658 F. 2d 471 (1981); and Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d 825.
See also infra notes 171-180 and accompanying text for a discussion of Naccash.
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In 1982, the Supreme Court of Virginia also joined this growing minority. In
Naccash v. Burger,171 Virginia recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth on behalf
of the parents of a child born with a disease that a physician negligently failed to
diagnose during the mother’s pregnancy.172 The plaintiffs brought suit against the
defendant physician and testified that, had they known they were carriers, they would
have insisted upon amniocentesis.173 Had the test had indicated that the fetus was
afflicted with the disease, Mrs. Burger would have had an abortion.174 The Burgers sued
the physician for the expenses incurred in caring for their daughter during her short life,
and for the mental anguish and suffering that they experienced as a result of the wrongful
birth.175
The physician in Naccash argued that the parents had no cause of action because
it was unknown to the common law and the legislature had not created it.176 The court,
however, responded that recognition of such a claim should be based on traditional tort
law principles, and, because the determination of the scope of the common law doctrine
of negligence is within the province of the judiciary, the issue was not open to legislative
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223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d at 827.
Id. The plaintiff’s daughter, born with Tay-Sachs disease, died two years after her birth. (Tay-Sach’s
disease is an invariably fatal disease of the brain and spinal cord that occurs in Jewish infants of European
ancestry. A diseased child appears normal at birth, but, at four to six months, its central nervous system
begins to degenerate, and it suffers eventual blindness, deafness, paralysis, seizures and mental retardation.
The life expectancy of an afflicted child is two to four years.) During her mother’s pregnancy, her father
was tested for Tay-Sach’s and was told that he was not a carrier. However, after being retested, Mr. Burger
was informed that he was in fact a Tay-Sach’s carrier. During Mrs. Burger’s fourth month of pregnancy,
she began to exhibit abnormalities. An examination revealed that she too was a carrier of Tay-Sach’s
disease. Id. at 827.
173
Amniocentesis is a procedure in which fluid from the amniotic sac of the pregnant woman is withdrawn
and studied to determine bio-chemical make-up. An analysis of the chromosomes present in the fluid
enables physicians to determine if the fetus is developing normally.
174
223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d. at 827.
175
223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d .at 828.
176
Id. See supra note 167 for the same argument espoused by the dissent in Speck.
172

32

sanction.177 After discussing the elements of negligence that must be present in order to
hold a defendant liable,178 the Virginia court concluded that Dr. Naccash breached a legal
duty owed to the Burgers. In so doing, the court asserted he caused them a direct injury,
thereby allowing them to recover any damages which were the reasonable and proximate
consequences of the defendant’s negligent act.179 The court held that since a reasonable
person could have foreseen the financial and emotional loss that resulted from the
physician’s negligence, the parents were entitled to recover damages for those injuries.180
In allowing the plaintiff parents to recover all damages that were the foreseeable
result of the physician’s negligence, the Naccash court fully compensated the plaintiffs
for the loss they suffered as a result of the birth of their genetically defective child.181
The Virginia court premised its position on the common law rules of negligence and
damages, as had the Pennsylvania court in Speck v. Finegold.182 As opposed to the
positions taken by the supreme courts of New Hampshire,183 Arkansas,184 and
Connecticut185 in the same year, neither the Pennsylvania nor the Virginia court allowed
claims of public policy to abrogate those principles.186 While the New Hampshire court,
in Kingsbury v. Smith,187 denied the plaintiffs costs for raising the wrongfully born child
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223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d at 828.
Id. See supra note 107 and infra note 255 for a discussion of these elements.
179
223 Va 406, 290 S.E. 2d at 829.
180
223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d at 830. The final award granted to the Burgers was $178,673.00.
181
223 Va. 406, 290 S.E. 2d at 825.
182
497 Pa. 77, 439 A. 2d 110.
183
Kingsbury v. Smith,122 N.H. 237, 442 A. 2d 1003 (1982). See supra notes 100-112 and accompanying
text.
184
Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.239, 628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982). See supra notes 113-125 and accompanying
text.
185
Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 442 A 2d 883 (1982). See supra notes 134-149 and accompanying
text.
186
See supra notes 161-167 and accompanying text for the Pennsylvania court’s discussion of public
policy.
187
122 N.H. 239, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
178
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partly because of its concern that such an award would create a windfall to the parents,188
the Pennsylvania court, in Speck v. Finegold,189 allowed that element of damage in order
to avoid granting an unjustifiable and unfair windfall to the physician.190 The sine qua
non of this inconsistency centers on the health of the wrongful birth child.191 Focusing on
this particularity rather than on the interests that the plaintiffs were attempting to protect
through their desire not to parent a child, a knowledgeable or accurate determination of
the extent of damage plaintiff parents have suffered, is impracticable.192 This interest can
be determined easily through application of fundamental principles of tort law,193 and the
extent of the injury can be ascertained by employing basic principles of common law
damages.194
Although they failed to define this interest, the five courts that recognized the
wrongful birth cause of action during the seminal year of 1982 determined liability by
applying the traditional negligence framework to new facts.195 Since that time, there has
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122 N.H. 239, 442 A.2d 1006. (1982)
497 Pa. 77, 438 A 2d 110 (1982).
190
497 Pa.77, 439 A. 2d at 115.
191
The position is evidenced by the New Hampshire court’s statement in Kingsbury v. Smith: “The ruling
today is limited to the facts of this case, involving a faulty sterilization procedure that resulted in the birth
of a healthy child. Other and differing circumstances, including and not limited to the birth of an abnormal
or injured child, might lead us to a different conclusion.” 122 N.H. 237, 442 A. 2d at 1006.
192
E.g., the Speck court did ascertain the parents’ interest. It determined that the plaintiff parents decided
not to have other children “for genetic and economic reasons.’´497 Pa. at 83 (emphasis added). Therefore,
in its awarding of rearing costs, the Pennsylvania court cannot be criticized for creating a windfall to the
parents. See, infra, notes 348-355 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this argument. (The Speck
decision was indirectly overturned by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1998 when it enacted 42 Pa.C.S.A.
sec. 8305 that denies claims for “wrongful birth.” However, see Butler v. Rolling Hill Hospital and Maria
Limberakis, D.O., K. Niki Cole, M.D., 400 Pa. Super. 141, 582 A.2d 1384 (1990) and infra note 208 and
accompanying text.
Also see Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990) and infra notes 218-225 and
accompanying text.
189
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See, infra notes 348-355 and accompanying text for a discussion of this approach.
Id.
195
As one earlier court maintained: “Contraception, conjugal relations, and childbirth are highly charged
subjects. It is all the more important, then, to emphasize that resolution of the case before us requires no
intrusion into the domain of moral philosophy. At issue here is simply the extent to which defendant is
194
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been very little deviation from those decisions. 196 In ascertaining the extent of that
liability, however, these courts generally either failed to apply or misapplied fundamental
rules of common law damages, thereby further diminishing the possibility of an accurate
damage determination and increasing the likelihood of awarding a windfall to one of the
parties.197

III.

WRONGFUL BIRTH ATTEMPTS TO GROW UP

A. Legislatures Interfere and Deny The Cause Of Action
Beginning in the early twenty-first century, nine state legislatures relieved the
courts of their states from deciding cases regarding this troublesome tort.198 In doing so,
those legislatures also deprived injured plaintiffs of redress from an entire sector of the
population: physicians and other health care providers for these potential defendants’
having engaged in the basic and centuries-old tort of negligently inflicted harm.
The Pennsylvania statute,199 enacted in 1988, is typical, and states, inter alia, “(a)
Wrongful Birth. There shall be no cause of action or award of damages on behalf of any
person based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a person once
conceived would not or should not have been born.”

liable for the consequences of his negligence. In reversing and remanding for trial, we go no further than to
apply settled common law principles.” Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
196
See infra notes 212-235 and accompanying text.
197
See infra notes 227-355 and accompanying text for a discussion of damages within the context of
wrongful birth.
198
See Idaho Code section 5-334; Ind. Code Ann. Section 34-12-1-1; Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. Section
600-2971; Minn. Stat. Ann. Section 145-424; Mo. Ann. Stat. section 188.130; N.D. Cent. Code section 3203-43; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Section 8305(b); S.D. Codified Laws section 21-55-1; Utah Code Ann.
section 78-11-24.
199
42 Pa.C.S.A. Sec 8305 (2005). (The second part of this statute prohibits an action for “wrongful life.)
For a discussion of wrongful life, see supra note 1.
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Somewhat ironically, Pennsylvania had been, at least through its courts, a
supporter of the basic right of its citizens to recover for negligently inflicted harm.200
The legislature’s determination to relieve physicians and other health care providers from
acting with due care had little to do with tort reform or lobbying by physicians; it had
everything to do with abortion.201
The legislative history of the Pennsylvania statute202 is replete with indications
that it was not proposed, drafted and passed for the purpose of fundamental tort reform; it
was enacted to deter women from having abortions. The legislature intended to
accomplish this purpose by encouraging physicians to withhold information from women
about the health of their fetuses—information that might lead women to seek
abortions.”203
One commentator has argued that the Pennsylvania statute is unconstitutional
because it infringes upon the right of a woman to make an informed consent based on her
right to terminate her pregnancy.204 According to this argument, although the statute may
appear neutral on its face, the legislative history is replete with evidence of a desire by
the legislators to discourage abortions.205
Irrespective of such arguments, the Pennsylvania courts (as well as courts in the
eight other states that have enacted basically identical statutes) have consistently upheld
the constitutionality (under both the State and Federal Constitutions) of such statutes.
200

See Speck v. Finegold, 490 Pa. 77, 239 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1982).
For a discussion of the difficulty courts have had regarding a plaintiff’s mitigating her damages when
faced with an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy through terminating her pregnancy, see infra notes 272313 and accompanying text.
202
See Pa. House Leg. J. 1509 (June 20, 1984).
203
See Note, “Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statues Barring Claims for Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,” 61 Brook.
Law. Rev. 235 (Spring 1995).
204
Id.
205
Id. at 239.
201
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Facing challenges to such statutes, the courts have (more often then not) opined that the
statute in question does not deny a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy; it merely
prevents her from suing a health-care professional for his or her medical malpractice.206
One federal court, interpreting the Pennsylvania statute, made this extremely clear when
it stated that Pennsylvania’s wrongful birth statute merely immunizes the health care
provider from liability should he or she be negligent.207
Arguably, the only rational decision handed down by a Pennsylvania court since
the enactment of its statute barring claims for wrongful birth, was that in Butler v. Rolling
Hill Hospital and Maria Limberakis, D.O., K. Niki Cole, M.D.208 In Butler, the court
stated that an action by a patient against a doctor for damages because of the doctor’s
failure to timely order a pregnancy test and diagnose the pregnancy of a patient, thus
preventing the patient from being able to legally abort the child, was proscribed by the
Pennsylvania wrongful birth statute. However, importantly and wisely, it held that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for “medical expenses, lost wages related to
206

See Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 424 Pa. Super 549, 623 A.2d 816, (1993)
(Pennsylvania statute prohibiting any cause of action for wrongful birth did not violate the pregnant
woman’s constitutional right to choose abortion over child birth by preventing her from recovering any
damages for the doctor’s negligent failure to diagnose profound defects with which the child would be born
if he were carried to term; the statute neither regulated nor directly affected the woman’s right to abortion);
Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 424 Pa. Super. 549, 623 A.2d 816 (1993) (Pennsylvania
statute prohibiting any cause of action for wrongful birth did not violate a pregnant woman’s equal
protection rights, by arbitrarily distinguishing between victims of doctor’s preconception and post
conception negligence; the statute was rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting fetal
life, in reducing the number of medical malpractice actions, and in keeping the cost of medical malpractice
insurance low); Flickinger v. Wanczyk, 843 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (neither Pennsylvania’s wrongful
birth statute nor Pennsylvania’s denial of a cause of action for wrongful birth encourages negligent
behavior by doctors or laboratories providing fetal screening diagnostic services as needed, to convert
physicians and laboratories into state actors for purposes of a Section 1983 civil rights claim by parents of
a child born with undiagnosed spin bifida; Pennsylvania law did not provide significant encouragement to
private doctors and laboratories to infringe on a woman’s right to make an informed choice regarding her
pregnancy); Bianchini v. N.K.D.S. Associates Ltd., 420 Pa. Super. 294, 616 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(statute precluding recovery for wrongful birth applied to suit seeking damages on grounds that untimely
diagnosis of fetal abnormalities precluded mother from having an abortion and subjected her to physical
and emotional traumas involved in carrying the child to term).
207
Flickinger v. Wanczyk, 843 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
208
400 Pa. Super. 141, 582 A.2d 1384 (1990).
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prenatal care, delivery, and post-natal care, as well as compensation for pain and
suffering incurred during the pre-natal through post-natal periods” from the doctor who
had previously performed an unsuccessful tubal ligation and laparoscopic procedure.209
The Butler court, in casting the plaintiff’s cause of action in the terms of
negligence, instead of “wrongful birth,” allowed the damaged plaintiff a remedy for her
financial loss. The potential hegemony of the Pennsylvania statute was vitiated by the
court’s rational, fair and logical approach.
In the states that do not statutorily bar actions for wrongful birth, the remedy the
Butler court chose is the remedy applied by the majority of courts.210 Therefore, it is
obvious that although the term “wrongful birth” has been burdened by the rhetoric of
some legislatures that to allow such a cause of action would seem to condone the
potential plaintiff’s right to legally terminate her pregnancy (one of a plaintiff’s
potentially mitigating options the defense might raise with respect to abrogating or
reducing the extent of his financial liability), an astute plaintiff not seeking rearing costs
for the unplanned or unwanted child can bypass these draconian statutes by simply
pleading traditional, time-honored, negligently inflicted harm.
The absurdity of this situation is palpable. As Dean Prosser astutely observed, the
particular name a tort bears is of little relevance to the real issue, of whether “the
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the
defendant.”211 Outside of the nine states that legislatively bar actions for “wrongful
birth,” the courts have heeded Dean Prosser’s sage commentary, but not without
struggling with the proper measure of damages.
209

400 Pa. Super. at 144.
See, infra, notes 213-226 and accompanying text.
211
See, supra, note 17.
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B. Courts Continue To Struggle Unnecessarily
Today, 32 jurisdictions in the United States allow a cause of action for the
wrongful birth of a healthy child.212 Only a handful of states allow an award to an
injured plaintiff for rearing costs.213 Twenty-nine jurisdictions have ruled that the costs
of rearing the unplanned or unwanted child are absolutely not recoverable based on a
number of different rationales.214

212

See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala 1982); Univ. of Ariz. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Superior Ct. of
Maricopa, 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982); Foy v. Greenblott,
191 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982): Coleman v.
Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C.
1984); Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d. 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority
v. Graves, 314 S.E. 2d 653 (Ga. 1984); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385 (Ill. 1983); Garrison v.
Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Johnston v. Elkins, 736 P.2d 935 (Kan. 1987); Maggard v.
McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d. 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d. 810 (Me. 1986); Jones
v. Malinowski, 473 A. 2d 429 (Md. 1984); Clevenger v. Haling, 394 N.E.2d 1119 (Mass. 1979); Clapham
v. Yanga, 300 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Sherlock v. Stlillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.
1977); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H.
1982); P. v. Portadin, 432 A.2d. 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Hardin v. Farris, 530 P.2d. 407
(N.M. Ct. App. 1974); Mears v. Alhadeff, 451 N.Y.S. 2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Pierce v. Piver, 262
S.E.2d 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976); Mason v. W. Pa.
Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987); Garwood v. Locke, 552
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App. 1977); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984); James G. v. Caserta,
332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990); Beardsley v.
Wierdma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
213
See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Lovelace Med.
Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N. M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Zehr v. Haugen, 318 Ore. 647, 871 P.2d 1006
(1994); Marciniak v. Lundborg,, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990), Burke v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764,
551 N.E.2d 1 (1990); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 438 A.2d 110 (1982), Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va.
406, 290 S.E.2d 802 (1982); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); University of
Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court Of the State of Arizona, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294
(1983).
214
The Seslar court provided the following listing of jurisdictions that deny a plaintiff recovery for rearing
costs : Alabama: Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Alaska: M.A. v. United States, 951
P.2d 851 (Alaska 1998); Arkansas: Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982); D.C.: Flowers
v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Florida: Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So.2d 822 (Fla.
1984); Georgia: Altanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Ableson, 260 Ga. 711, 398 S.E. 2d 557
(1990); Illinois: Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d. 193, 69 Ill. Dec. 168, 447 N.E. 2d 385 (1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 846, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed. 2d. 139 (1983); Iowa: Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W. 2d. 520
(Iowa 1984); Kansas: Johnston v. Elkins, 241 Kan. 407, 736 P.2d 935 (1987); Kentucky: Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W. 2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Louisiana: Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La.
1988); Maine: Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Michigan: Rouse v. Wesley 196 Mich.
App. 624, 494 N.W. 2d 7 (1992); Missouri: Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W. 2d 295 (Mo. 1992); Nebraska:
Hitzemann v. Adam, 246 Neb. 201, 518 N.W. 2d 102 (1994); Nevada: Szekeres v. Robinson, 102 Nev .
93. 715 P. 2d 1076 (1985); New Hampshire: Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d. 1003 (1982);
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The most recent reported decision that denied recovery for child-rearing expenses,
Charree, M.D. v. Seslar ,215 held that “the costs involved in raising and educating a
normal, healthy child conceived subsequent to an allegedly negligent sterilization
procedure are not cognizable as damages in an action for medical negligence.” The
Supreme Court of Indiana based its decision on its opinion that “regardless of the
circumstance of birth [a child] does not constitute a ‘harm’ to the parents so as to permit
recovery for the costs associated with raising and educating the child…the value of a
child’s life to the parents outweighs the associated pecuniary burdens as a matter of
law.”216
Employing this facile and ill-advised line of reasoning, the Selsar court joined the
majority of jurisdictions in denying rearing costs based on medical malpractice resulting
from a physician’s incompetence.217
Conversely, one court chose to apply the traditional and time-honored principles
of tort law to the issue of negligently inflicted harm with respect to damage calculation.
In Burke v. Rivo,218 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was petitioned to
New Jersey: Garcia v. Meiselman, 220 N.J. Super. 317, 531 A.2d 1373 (1987); New York: O’Tolle v.
Greenberg, 64 N.Y.2d 427; 488 N.Y.Supp.2d 143, 477 N.E. 2d 445 (1985); North Carolina: Jackson v.
Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E. 2d 743 (1986); Ohio: Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 44 Ohio
St. 3d 49, 540 N.E.2d 1370 (Oh. 1989); Oklahoma: Wofford v. Davis, 764 P.2d 161 (Okla. 1988);
Pennsylvania: Butler v. Rolling Hill Hosp, 400 Pa.Super. 141, 582 A.2d 1384 (1990); Rhode Island:
Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997); Tennessee: Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn.
1987); Texas: Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. Civ.App. 1973); Utah: C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d
504 (Utah 1988); Virginia: Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 (1986); Washington:
McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash.2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984); West Virginia: James G. v. Caserta, 175
W.Va. 406, 332 S.E. 2d 872 (1985); Wyoming: Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
See infra, notes 215 - and accompanying text.
215
786 N.E. 2d 705 (Ind. 2003).
216
Id. at 708.
217
See supra, note 199.
218
406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990). The procedural posture of this opinion is somewhat byzantine.
However, it was essentially a certified question from the lower court asking for guidance on the following:
“What is the measure of damages in an action claiming (a) breach of a guarantee that a surgical procedure
would forever prevent pregnancy; and (b) negligence in performing that procedure, where the child born as
a result of the pregnancy was in every way normal and healthy?” Burke at 765, footnote 2.
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resolve the issue of rearing costs when a woman whose physician negligently performed
a sterilization procedure led to the woman’s giving birth to a healthy child.
The plaintiff wife, Carole Burke, sought the sterilization procedure from the
defendant for the sole reason that the “Burke family was experiencing financial
difficulties. She wanted to return to work to support her family and to fulfil [sic] her
career goals.”219 The defendant physician recommended and performed a bipolar
cauterization procedure and guaranteed the plaintiff she would not again become
pregnant; nevertheless, Burke gave birth to another child.
The Massachusetts court recognized that “the great weight of authority permits
the parents of a normal child born as a result of a physician’s negligence to recover
damages directly associated with the birth…but courts are divided on whether the parents
may recover the economic expense of rearing the child.”220 The court agreed with the

219

Burke at 765.
Id. at 766. The Court’s laundry listing of cases provides: “Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So.2d 718, 721
(Ala. 1982) (damages include physical pain and suffering and mental anguish of mother, husband’s loss of
consortium, and medical expenses of pregnancy, but not child-rearing expenses); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark.
239, 244, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982) (all “proper damages” connected with failed vasectomy and unwanted
pregnancy recoverable, but for reasons of public policy not expenses of rearing child); Coleman v.
Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11 n. 5, 13-14 (Del. 1975) (pregnancy-related damage allowed below and not
challenged on appeal; no liability for rearing and educating child); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478
A.2d 1073, 1074, 1077-1078 (D.C. 1984) (recovery of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost
wages during pregnancy; wages lost after birth until mother returned to work; and cost of a properly
performed tubal ligation, allowed below and not challenged on appeal; child-rearing costs not
recoverable); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (damages for
medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering caused by unwanted pregnancy not appealed;
reasonable cost of rearing child offset by the value of the child’s companionship not recognized); Cockrum
v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 200-201, 69 Ill..Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846, 104
S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d. 139 (1983) (child-rearing expenses not recoverable); Nanke v. Napier, 345 N.W.2d
520, 522 (Iowa 1984) (same); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983) (same); Macomber v.
Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1986) (medical expenses of pregnancy and sterilization, mother’s pain
and suffering, mothers lost earnings, husband’s loss of consortium, recoverable, but child-rearing costs not
recoverable); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 242-243, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982) (recovery limited to
medical expenses, cost of sterilization, pain and suffering of the pregnancy, mother’s lost wages, husband’s
loss of consortium); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 486-487, 453 A.2d 974 (1982) (tort and
contract recovery for medical expenses and lost wages related to prenatal care, delivery, and postnatal care,
and associated pain and suffering; no recovery for financial and emotional costs of child-rearing); Smith
v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751 (Tenn. 1987) (allowing recovery for medical expenses, recovery, delivery,
pain and suffering, and emotional distress during pregnancy but not child-rearing costs); McKernan v.
220
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lower court that proper damages would include, at a minimum,” the cost of the
unsuccessful sterilization procedure and costs directly flowing from the pregnancy, the
wife’s lost earning capacity; medical expenses of the delivery and care following the
birth; the cost of care for the other children while the wife was incapacitated; the cost of
the second sterilization procedure and any expenses flowing from that operation; and the
husband’s loss of consortium [and the emotional distress associated with the unwanted
pregnancy].”221
Recognizing that the “principal issue” before it “[was] whether the plaintiffs were
entitled, if they establish[ed] liability, to the cost of raising their child,” the court made it
clear that under both contract and tort principles, the expenses associated with rearing the
unplanned child were “a reasonably foreseeable and a natural and probable consequence
of the wrongs that the plaintiffs allege.” 222 The court queried whether there were any
public policy considerations that should limit “traditional tort and contract damages,”
and concluded that “there [were] none as to parents who have elected sterilization for
economic reasons.”223
The Massachusetts court concluded that the parents of a healthy but (at least
initially) unwanted child may recover the cost of rearing that child if their “reason for

Aasheim, 102 Wash.2d 411, 419-421, 687 P.2d 850 (1984) (pain and suffering, loss of consortium,
expenses of failed sterilization procedure and child birth, but not child-rearing expenses, recoverable);
James G. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 876-878 (W.Va. 1985) (medical expenses of unsuccessful sterilization,
childbirth, subsequent sterilization operation; wife’s pain and suffering; loss of consortium recoverable, but
not child-rearing expenses); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 518-519, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974) (no recovery for child-rearing costs); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982)
(various pregnancy and sterilization related expenses, but not child-rearing expenses, recoverable).
Contrast Szekeres v. Robinison, 102 Nev. 93, 95, 715 P.2d 1076 (1986) (no tort liability for any expenses
incurred as result of allegedly negligent sterilization operation; contract liability for, at least, cost of failed
surgery, recognized.” Id. at 767-768.
221
Burke at 768.
222
Id. at 769.
223
Id. (emphasis added)
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seeking sterilization was founded on economic or financial considerations.”224
Nevertheless, it also stated that “the trier of fact should offset against the cost of rearing
the child the benefit, if any, the parents receive and will receive from having their
child.”225
Thus, the Massachusetts court joined the five other jurisdictions that allow
recovery of the cost of rearing a normal child to adulthood, more often than not offset by
the benefits that the parents receive in giving birth to and raising a normal, healthy
child.226 Although this approach is preferable to an outright denial of damages to the
injured plaintiff, it still misses the basic point of the cause of action for negligently
inflicted harm.

IV. THE OBFUSCATION OF PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF COMMON LAW
DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF WRONGFUL BIRTH:
FREQUENT MISAPPLICATION AND NON-APPLICATION
The primary purpose of tort law in awarding damages to injured parties is to
return plaintiffs to the positions they were in prior to the negligent conduct of the
tortfeasor.227 The law attempts to compensate the victim for the loss he has suffered by
awarding money damages.228 A secondary, though significant goal of the damages

224

Burke at 772.
Id. See infra notes 314-343 and accompanying text.
226
See University of Arizona. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 584-585, 667 P.2d
1294 (1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 259-260, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 299
Md. 257, 270-271, 473 A.2d 429 (1984); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175-176 (Minn.
1977); Hartke v. MeKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1557-1558 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (because the benefit conferred did
not affect the economic interest that was harmed, no mitigation of the cost of child-rearing should be
recognized on the facts of this case).
227
See generally, 2 F. Harper and F. James, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 at 1299 (1956).
228
One exception is punitive damages. C. McCormick, DAMAGES, §77 at 275 (1935). Punitive damages
have been claimed in only one wrongful birth case. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967), in which the court allowed the plaintiff parents to plead fraud and deceit after the
225
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remedy is the prophylactic factor -- the attempt to deter negligence and promote the
exercise of due care on the part of a defendant and his peers.229
To properly effect these objectives, courts have developed principles to employ in
determining the fact or extent of a recovery. Thus, damages in tort may be denied on the
basis of public policy,230 or because of the impossibility of calculation without
speculation.231 In addition, damage awards may be offset by the plaintiff’s failure to
mitigate the loss,232 or by the plaintiff’s receipt of a benefit through the loss he
suffered.233
Each of these firmly established damage principles has been used in the
disposition of wrongful birth cases.234 However, as applied to this area of the law, these
principles have often served to insulate members of the medical profession from full
liability for the losses they have occasioned.235 For instance, a Kentucky court of
appeals, when faced with a claim for rearing costs in a wrongful birth case, admitted that
it would defy logic and the concepts of causation to propose that such damages should

physician represented to the plaintiff mother that a sterilization operation was necessary for her physical
and mental well-being.
229
See Prosser, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, (4th ed. 1971): “The ‘prophylatic’ factor of preventing
future harm has been quite important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with
compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the courts
become known, and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to
prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for imposing liability is the deliberate
purpose of providing that incentive.”
230
Coleman v. Garrison, 347 A. 2d 8 (Del. 1975) (plaintiff could not recover from surgeon for alleged
improper performance of sterilization operation because the value of a human life outweighs any damage
which might be said to follow the fact of birth).
231
See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W. 2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (damages in a negligent sterilization
wrongful birth case denied partly because of impossibility of proper calculation without speculation).
232
See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242 (1974) (the absence of steps to
terminate parental rights is material as reflecting parental intent to keep and raise child).
See also infra notes 272-313 and accompanying text for a discussion of damage mitigation in
wrongful birth suits.
233
See, infra notes 314-343 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefits rule.
234
See notes 230-23339 and accompanying text.
235
See infra notes 240-255 and accompanying text for a discussion of the often spurious manners with
which courts have employed these postulates.
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not be submitted to a jury for assessment.236 It continued: “Common sense tells us that it
is in society’s best interests to hold physicians to a standard of professional competence
and impose liability when they are negligent in treating their patients.”237 Nevertheless,
the court resorted to an undefined public policy in denying the parent plaintiffs recovery
for the costs of raising the unwanted child.238 Other courts, although misapplying these
principles and policies, have been more generous in defining their rationales for limiting
recovery. 239

A. The Invocation of Public Policy To Defeat An Award Of Rearing Costs
The most frequently cited policy argument used in denying parent plaintiffs
recovery for the costs of rearing the unplanned child is that the child would suffer
irreparable harm by forever shouldering the burden of having been born an “emotional
bastard.”240 The Arkansas court, in Wilbur v. Kerr,241 maintained that the child would
someday learn that he was unwanted by his family because someone other than his
parents had paid for his rearing.242 Reasoning that our society has not become so
sophisticated as to ignore such an emotional trauma, the court denied damages for the
costs of raising the child.243
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Maggard v. McKelvy, 627 S.W. 2d 44 (Ky. App. 1981) (parents brought action in tort against physician
for the birth of an unwanted child, alleging negligence in the performance of a bilateral vasectomy upon
husband).
237
Id. at 48.
238
Id. (without a clear expression of public opinion to the contrary, public policy prohibits the extension of
liability to include damages for rearing an unwanted child).
239
See infra notes 240-313 and accompanying text for a discussion of these rationales.
240
628 S.W. 2d 568 (1982). See supra notes 113-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wilbur.
241
628 S.W. 2d at 570.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 571. The rationale of the Wilbur court has not gained wide acceptance. One court, in recognizing
the concern raised by the Arkansas Supreme court, suggested the use of a pseudonym in place of the
parents’ name in the case style. See Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A. 2d 204 (1976)
(the Connecticut court asserted that the use of the pseudonym would lessen the chance of personal publicity
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In emphasizing the emotional effect that the parents’ damage claim may have on
the child, the Wilbur court failed to recognize that such an effect is more likely to result
not from the awarding of rearing costs, but from the litigation process leading to such an
award and the child’s ultimately learning of the suit. Furthermore, a resolution of this
problem is better left to the individual parents than to the courts.
Citing Wilbur, the Burke court stated bluntly: “We are …unimpressed with the
reasoning that child rearing expenses should not be allowed because some day the child
could be adversely affected by learning that he or she was unwanted and that someone
else had paid for the expense of rearing the child….. Courts expressing concern about the
effect on the child nevertheless allow the parents to recover certain direct expenses from
the negligent physician without expressing concern about ham to the child when the child
learns that he or she was unwanted.”244 Additionally, the Burke court maintained that “it
is for the parents, not the courts to decide whether a lawsuit would adversely affect the
child and should not be maintained.”245
Because it is generally accepted that the parents and not the courts are charged
with the responsibility for the care and well being of their children,246 the parents,
therefore, should be allowed to make the decision whether the potential emotional impact
on a child warrants refraining from bringing a wrongful birth action. If the plaintiffs’
original decision not to parent another child was based on economic inability to finance
the rearing of another child, then, irrespective of the possible trauma it may cause, the

for the parent plaintiffs and the wrongful birth infant). Attempting to rebut the “emotional bastard”
contention, a Florida court suggested that the child should not be thought of as unloved, but merely as
unplanned. See Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1936).
244
Burke, 551 N.E.2d at 4.
245
Id. at 5.
246
See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
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parents may feel compelled to bring a wrongful birth suit in order to financially secure
the child’s future. Therefore, the bare allegation that there may be negative emotional
affects on a child simply because his parents were awarded rearing costs rather than only
medical and hospital expenses in an action for wrongful birth, simply should not prove
strong enough to persuade a court to insulate the defendant and disallow a proper
recovery to the plaintiffs.
A second contention that is also based on considerations of public policy and
frequently employed by courts in denying rearing costs is the “surrogate parent”
argument, introduced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Reick v. Medical Protective
Co.247 The Wisconsin court decided that public policy does not permit imposing the
burden of child rearing costs on physicians while allowing the parents to retain the
child.248 The court asserted that while the intangible benefits of raising a child would
remain with the parents,249 every financial cost or detriment would be shifted to the
defendant physician.250 Thus, it was concluded that such a result would place an
unreasonable burden upon physicians.251
The Reick court’s reasoning is unsound for two reasons. First, without
ascertaining the plaintiff’s interest in seeking to avoid having another child, it is
impossible to determine the extent of the injury that he or she has suffered as a result of
the birth, and therefore irresponsible to claim that damages are unreasonable. Secondly,
if the parents conclude that it is in the best interest of the child to raise him with money
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obtained through a wrongful birth suit, this decision should be upheld252 regardless of any
negative connotations possibly arising from arbitrarily placing upon the physician the
title of surrogate parent. 253
Finally, it has been held that the awarding of rearing costs is unjust because such a
recovery is out of proportion to the physician’s culpability.254 This position is untenable
under the fundamental concept of causation in tort law.255 When a woman undergoes
surgery for sterilization or abortion, regardless of the purpose motivating the decision,
she does so because she desires not to give birth to another child. If the operation is
252

See infra note 299 and accompanying text for an expansion of this argument.
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The cause of action for wrongful birth has been denied on the basis of proximate cause. In Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis, 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
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also led the Delaware court in Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A. 2d 8 (1975), to deny the cause of action, while
a federal court in Texas refused the claim because it was simply not foreseeable that a “pregnancy may
result in the birthing of an abnormal child.” See Lapoint v. Shirly, 409 F. Supp. 118 (Texas 1976).
253

48

negligently performed and the mother does give birth, then she must prove that the
physician’s negligence was the cause of the birth. Assuming she does so, then the
physician should be held responsible for all proximate consequences of his tort. The
courts that have disallowed the plaintiff parent’s costs for rearing have overlooked the
fact that the foreseeable consequences of the physician’s negligence do not stop at the
maternity ward door.

B. Surmounting the Barrier of Damage Speculation
Another issue that has concerned the courts in deciding cases of wrongful birth is
the problem of speculative damages. While the arguments for denying parents the costs
of rearing based on public policy are often nebulous and incapable of legal
justification,256 it is a well established principle of damages that a plaintiff must not only
establish the existence of an injury, but also the amount of loss he has suffered.257 In
wrongful birth cases where the fact of damage is clearly established some courts have
denied recovery because of the difficulty in measuring damages.258
Adhering to this view, courts have misconstrued and misapplied the rule of
certainty in the context of wrongful birth. The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule as
requiring only proof of the fact of damages from which the jury may infer a just and
reasonable estimate of the extent of damage.259 Although an estimation of the costs of
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rearing a child will often involve methods of proof more complicated and sophisticated
than those used to determine medical and hospital costs,260 many courts have properly
concluded that this difficulty is not tantamount to denying the plaintiff the opportunity to
present evidence of the expected costs.261 In Berman v. Allan, for instance, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey stated that “to deny the plaintiffs redress for their injuries merely
because damages cannot be measured with precise exactitude would constitute a
perversion of fundamental principles of justice.”262 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in
Ochs v. Borelli,263 properly met the question of certainty in stating that it has “no basis
for distinguishing this case from other tort cases in which the trier of fact fixes damages
for wrongful death . . . or for loss of consortium.”264 In correctly formulating and
accurately applying the rule of certainty, the Ochs court265 followed the majority of
jurisdictions that allow claims for wrongful birth.266
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Marciniak v Lundborg,267 stated without doubt
that the issue of damage speculation in wrongful birth cases is a non-issue. The
“[d]efendants…argue that child rearing costs are too speculative and that it is impossible
to establish with reasonable certainty the damages to the parents. We do not
agree…similar calculations are routinely performed in countless other malpractice

260

Methods such as statistics on the general costs of raising a child in the plaintiff’s geographical area, the
income level of the parents, and the amount of money spent or being spent by the parents on other children
in the family, must be employed.
261
See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
262
80 N.J. 421, 433, 404 A. 2d 8, 15 (1979). (The Berman court was addressing the issue of emotional
damages.)
263
187 Conn. 253 (1982).
264
Id. at 260.
265
It is noted that the Wilbur court also briefly mentioned the problem of speculation. However, that issue
was not determinative in its ruling. The Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and Virginia courts did not raise
the issue of speculation.
266
See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W. 2d 511 (1971).
267
153 Wis. 2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990).

50

situations.” 268 The court continued by recognizing that “[j]uries are frequently called on
to make far more complex damage assessments in other tort cases” and [p]opulation
studies are readily available to provide figures for the costs of raising a child.”269 The
court ruled against the defendants with respect to this claim. Similarly, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Burke v. Rivo,270 stated that the “determination of
the anticipated costs of child-rearing is no more complicated or fanciful than many
calculations of future losses made every day in tort cases.”271
It is clear, therefore, that the issue of a potentially speculative damage calculation
for the birth of a healthy, yet unplanned or unwanted child merely is a futile attempt by
negligent physicians to avoid the consequences of their wrongdoing. Thus, the
malfeasant defendants turn to yet another potential argument.

C. The Troublesome Issue of Damage Mitigation
The doctrine of damage mitigation generally has not been applied to wrongful
birth cases.272 The courts that have recognized a claim for wrongful birth 273 have
conformed to the majority position by not analyzing whether the plaintiffs could have
limited their damages. The doctrine of damage mitigation requires a plaintiff to take
reasonable measures to minimize the financial consequences of the defendant’s
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negligence.274 Also known as the rule of avoidable consequences,275 it denies recovery
for any damages that could have been reasonably avoided after the tortfeasor committed
the wrong.276 Application of this rule to mitigation in wrongful birth claims would
require that the child be aborted or put up for adoption.277 If either abortion or adoption
were determined to be reasonable conduct, and the plaintiff failed to employ such
measures, recovery of damages for the costs of rearing could be denied.278
Considering the zeal with which courts have applied other rules of damages279 to
protect the medical profession from the financial burden of wrongful birth claims,280 it is
anomalous that these same courts have neglected to require defendants to mitigate their
damages. In fact, it has generally been held, as a per se rule of law, that such efforts on
the part of the claimants are unnecessary.281
While courts purport to treat the wrongful birth action within the framework of
negligence,282 they nevertheless decline to apply the firmly established tort principle of
damage mitigation.283 In so doing, the courts have increased the likelihood of imposing
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an unjust ruling on the parties to the wrongful birth suit. As opposed to the other
situations in which the courts have failed to apply or have misapplied common law rules
of damages in the wrongful birth setting,284 the error here is not the possible creation of a
windfall to the defendant physician through a denial of rearing costs,285 but the chance of
erroneously compensating the parent plaintiffs with those costs.
In not deferring these questions to the jury, the courts that have dealt with
wrongful birth claims have also, arguably, contravened two principles of law. First, it is
a well established postulate of tort law that the negligent tortfeasor takes his victim as he
finds him.286 That is, the victim’s individual nature will often determine the extent of the
wrongdoer’s liability. Second, the United States Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,
established an unqualified right for any woman to obtain an abortion during the first
trimester of her pregnancy.287 While courts have been willing to use this holding for
purposes of finding injury in wrongful birth cases,288 it has been ignored with respect to
mitigation. This result has been justified on the basis of an overriding public policy and
on the reasonableness corollary to the rule of mitigation.
The primary policy argument against mitigating damages through abortion is
premised on the public controversy surrounding that issue. For many people, abortion
involves a profound moral and religious question. For instance, the Court of Claims of
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New York, in Rivera v. State,289 held that a “rule of law which required the claimant to
have an abortion would constitute an invasion of privacy of the grossest and most
pernicious kind.”290 The court asserted that a decision regarding abortion is for the
individual to make based upon her own religious, philosophical or moral principles;
while abortion is a right, it is not an obligation.291 On the basis of these considerations,
the Rivera court concluded that the failure of the plaintiff to obtain an abortion would not
affect her cause of action.292 The Michigan Supreme Court, in Troppi v. Scarf,293 reached
the same result and held that the jury could not “take into consideration the fact that the
plaintiff might have aborted the fetus.”294
Additionally, Roe (and its progeny) has been construed as to not only allow
abortion (under its requirements), but to prohibit any governmental interference with a
woman’s right to choose not to have an abortion. In Arnold v. Board of Education of
Escambia County, Alabama, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
opined that: “[i]t is freedom in the decision making process which receives constitutional
protection…. Resolution of the childbearing decision embraces two alternatives, those of
aborting the child or carrying the child to term. Both alternatives enjoy constitutional
289
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protection from unwarranted governmental interference.”295 The court continued by
stating that there simply is no difference between choosing to abort a fetus or to carry it;
both choices are legal under the constitutional right of privacy.296
Although adoption does not possess the same religious, philosophical or moral
questions inherent in the problem of abortion, courts have treated the two options
identically.297 In Troppi, the Michigan court stated that a determination of
reasonableness is actually a determination of that which is in the child’s best interest.298
The court held that the law had long recognized the desirability of allowing a child to be
reared by his natural parents.299 Thus, it was concluded that the parents may have
reasonably believed that the child would be damaged by the “hazards of adoption,” and
as a “matter of personal conscience and choice” wished to keep their once unwanted
child.300
The legal rationale most frequently asserted for these conclusions is that the
procedures of abortion or adoption are not within the scope of reasonable conduct.301
Quoting from McCormick on Damages,302 an Illinois appeals court, in Cockrum v.
Baumgartner,303 declared
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If the effort, risk, sacrifice or expense which the
person wronged must incur in order to avoid or minimize a
loss or injury is such that under all the circumstances a
reasonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to
do so imposes no disability against recovering full
damages.304
The Illinois court concluded that as a matter of law, no mother can be reasonably asked to
abort or to place her child up for adoption.305
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Marciniak v. Lundborg306 was of the same
mindset. In considering the issue, it stated that the refusal of the defendants “to abort the
unplanned child or give it up for adoption should be considered as a failure…to mitigate
…damages. The rules requiring mitigation of damages require only that reasonable
measures be taken” and it is not “reasonable to expect parents to essentially choose
between the child and the cause of action.”307 Recognizing that such a decision would be
a “Hobson’s choice,” the court declined to impose the mitigation principle to cases of
wrongful birth for fear that it would be involving itself in “highly personal matters [that]
involve deeply held moral or religious convictions.”308
Although it could be argued that while abortion or adoption may be unreasonable
conduct for many parents, as a matter of fact, they should not be considered, as a matter
of law, unreasonable for all parents. Therefore, since the decision whether to have an
abortion is a legal right, and the plaintiff must take the victim as he finds him, the trier of
fact in a wrongful birth suit should be allowed to determine on a case by case basis what
304
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is to be considered reasonable conduct regarding mitigation of damages. If the plaintiffs
were unable to justify their failure to mitigate, the court would reduce their recovery.
Such a determination would also serve the purpose of preventing fraudulent claims for
rearing costs.309 For example, in Hartke v. McKelway,310 the court determined that the
plaintiff’s decision to keep a child born following a negligent sterilization was not the
result of principled objections to abortion, since she had chosen to terminate her previous
pregnancy.311 It, therefore, denied the plaintiff’s claim of damages for raising the
wrongfully born child.312
However, in balancing the competing values involved in the issue of damage
mitigation for wrongful birth, the courts have weighed the question of reasonableness
heavily and determined that it is per se unreasonable to hold parents responsible for
choosing not to abort the unplanned fetus, or, once born, place the child up for
adoption.313 In not holding parents to the rule of mitigation, courts have increased the
possibility of creating windfall verdicts to the plaintiffs and presenting practitioners in the
medical profession with unreasonable financial burdens. However, other, less
controversial, arguments have been utilized in seeking to avoid those consequences. The
foremost arguments that have been put forth to prevent windfalls and limit liability are
the theories of the overriding or offsetting benefits of parenthood.
309
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D. The Overriding or Offsetting Benefits of Parenting
In the earliest litigation over claims for wrongful birth, the plaintiff parents were
denied recovery based on the rationale that the joys of parenthood far exceed any injury
suffered from the birth of a child.314 One court asserted that “as reasonable persons the
jury may well have concluded that appellants have suffered no injury in the birth of a
normal, healthy child.”315 The benefits that were considered to outweigh the possible
injury included the fun, the joy and the affection received in raising and educating a
child.316
The theory that birth is a blessing which overrides any concurrent detriment has
been employed by many courts over the years. In 1973, a Texas court of appeals held
that the plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful birth must fail because a price tag cannot
be placed on a “child’s smile.”317 Similarly, in 1980, a Florida court of appeals
maintained that “[i]t is a universally shared emotion and sentiment that the intangible but
all-important, incalculable but invaluable ‘benefits’ of parenthood far outweigh any of the
mere monetary burdens involved.”318
Conversely, many courts have concluded that the wrongful birth of a child inflicts
financial injury on the parents.319 A Minnesota court declared that it would be “myopic
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to declare today that the benefits exceed the costs as a matter of law.”320 However, the
“overriding benefits theory” has not been completely abandoned. Instead, the courts have
given it new life in conjunction with section 920 of the Restatement of Torts, Second, and
have applied it to offset, rather than override a recovery for wrongful birth.321
As defined in the Restatement, the rule states:
When the defendant’s tortious conduct has caused
harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in doing so has
conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages to the extent that this
is equitable.322
The courts that have applied the offsetting benefits rule have done so in two
different ways. The first method of application, the majority approach, was employed by
the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Ochs v. Borrelli.323 The court evaluated the various
benefits of parenthood and weighed them against the financial detriments the plaintiffs
suffered.324
The Connecticut court suggested that such benefits include the “satisfaction, the
fun, the joy and the companionship . . . which the plaintiffs as parents have had and will
have in the rearing of the child.”325 The court went on to suggest that these benefits will
make economic expenditures worthwhile.326
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The Connecticut Supreme Court’s balancing-of- interests approach should be
recognized as superior to the overriding benefits theory or to a per se denial of expenses
of child rearing, because the injured parents are at least partially compensated for the
financial loss they have suffered as a result of the wrongful birth. However, the
Connecticut court’s analysis is flawed in that it ignores the “same interest” limitation of
the Restatement. A careful reading of section 920327 reveals that it is not the plaintiff
who must benefit through the defendant’s tort in order to fall within the parameters of the
rule; rather, it is the “interest” or purpose that the plaintiff was seeking to secure at the
time of the defendant’s wrongdoing.
The interest sought to be protected by an individual who seeks to avoid parenting
a child is paramount because even if it is argued that a child is always a blessing, that
argument is patently spurious when the potential parent does not want that blessing.
Applying the “off-setting” benefits limitation to wrongful birth cases therefore requires
the courts to determine the purpose for which the potential parents attempted to avoid the
birth of a child.
Only two courts have applied the theory of offsetting benefits by considering the
purpose behind the plaintiff’s attempt at birth control. These cases illustrate the second
approach to the benefits rule. In Custodio v. Bauer, 328 a woman sought a sterilization
operation to preclude further aggravation of a bladder and kidney condition. The
defendant physician negligently performed the operation and the woman eventually gave
birth. Applying the benefits rule literally, the California court concluded that the
“interest” the plaintiff was seeking to protect was her bladder and kidney condition. The
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court reasoned that if the failure of the sterilization operation in any way benefited the
plaintiff’s bladder and kidney condition, then the value of that benefit should be
subtracted from the award. 329 In addition, the court asserted that any benefits that the
plaintiff received from having the child, such as love and affection, have no relevance to
the interest she sought to protect and therefore should not serve to offset the award.
Since the plaintiff’s damages were not capable of being offset, the plaintiff was awarded
full costs for raising the child.330
Although the California court of appeals in Custodio correctly applied the rule of
offsetting benefits in determining that the intangible benefits of parenthood often are not
coextensive with the purpose for which a party submits to a sterilization procedure, the
court’s holding nevertheless suffers from a flaw in reasoning. Specifically, in
determining that the interest the plaintiff sought to protect was her kidney and bladder
condition, the court implicitly determined that the financial burden of raising another
child did not enter into the plaintiff’s decision to be sterilized. Regardless of the court’s
having awarded the plaintiff rearing costs, it did not do so based on its findings regarding
the benefits rule, but because of an unrelated rationale.331 Thus, the question still remains
as to whether in holding the physician financially responsible for rearing, the court has
placed an undue financial burden on the physician or created a windfall to the parents.
The Custodio court’s application of section 920 of the Restatement is both logical
and appropriate, yet it fails to provide any justification for the purpose it purports to serve
-- that is, allowing the parent plaintiffs recovery for the costs of raising the child. The
329
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California court’s reasoning leaves open the opportunity to hold that although the
plaintiff’s interest was not benefited by the tortfeasor’s wrong and hence damages cannot
be offset, rearing costs can be denied on other, yet to be articulated, grounds.
Two courts in 1990 made it clear that in their jurisdictions, the purpose for which
the plaintiff(s) sought recovery from the negligent physician should override the
“overriding” benefits rule.
Substantially agreeing with the Ochs court, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Burke v. Rivo332 concluded that when parents decide to not procreate
and the physician to whom they turn to assist them with their decision negligently fails to
grant them their objective, the misfeasor should be held responsible for the costs resulting
from the unwanted birth.333 In addressing the issue of the benefits a child might bring to
the parents, the court stated that “[t]he judicial declaration that the joy and pride in
raising a child always outweigh any economic loss the parents may suffer, thus
precluding recovery for the cost of raising the child simply lacks verisimilitude, [and]
[t]he very fact that a person has sought medical intervention to prevent him or her from
having a child demonstrates that, for that person, the benefits of parenthood did not
outweigh the burdens, economic and otherwise, of having a child.”334 The court held that
in addition to other damages recoverable from the negligent physician (such as the cost of
the unsuccessful procedure), the tortfeasor is liable for the costs of rearing the (at least
initially) unwanted child, offset by “the benefit, if any, the parents receive and will
receive from having their child.”335
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Thus, as did the Ochs court, the Burke court chose to not completely compensate
the plaintiff parents for the financial burden incurred as a direct and proximate result of
the defendant physician’s negligence. Unfortunately, regardless of the economic
hardships suffered by the parents of an unplanned, but healthy child, the parents continue
to be deprived of full redress for the consequences of the defendant’s wrongdoing.336
In contrast to the Connecticut court’s decision in Ochs, and the Massachusetts
court’s decision in Burke, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Marciniak v. Lundborg,337
posited that the “application of the [benefits rule] would require the jury to place a
monetary value on the benefits that would accrue to the parents as a result of the child
being with them, and offset those benefits against the interest that was harmed.” 338
Understanding the true meaning of Section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,339
the court continued: “The Restatement places two limitations on the application of the
benefits rule. The first…is that the circumstances to be considered in mitigation must
benefit the same interest that was harmed by the defendant’s tortious act. The second…is
that the benefit can offset the damage only to the extent that it is equitable.”340
Ultimately, the court concluded that it would be inequitable “to apply the benefit rule in
the context of the tort of [wrongful birth]” when the parents made a decision not to have a
child for the precise reason to avoid that benefit “that the parents went to the physician in
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the first place.”341 The court held that “the costs of raising the child to the age of majority
may not be offset by the benefits conferred upon the parents by virtue of the presence of
the child in their lives.”342
In its decisive and often emotional rationale, the court proposed that “[w]hen
parents make the decision to forego” the birth of another child, especially for economic
reasons, it would be ridiculous to allow the tortfeasor to avoid the consequences of his
negligence, regardless of any potential economic benefits the child might ultimately
provide to the injured plaintiffs.343
V. ASCERTAINING JUST COMPENSATION:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR AWARDING CHILD-REARING COSTS
The soundest approach to resolving claims for rearing costs in actions for
wrongful birth is the methodology used by the Custodio,344 Hartke,345 Burke 346 and
Marciniak 347 courts in their application or non-application of section 920 of the
Restatement. A trier of fact, when faced with a wrongful birth claim should ascertain the
purpose for which the plaintiff underwent the medical procedure in question to prevent
the birth of a child. This determination will provide a court with the information
necessary to accurately divine the type and extent of injury the plaintiff sustained as a
result of the negligent physician’s action or inaction. Such information, combined with
proper application of both negligence and common law damage principles is essential to
a just determination of questions of injury, culpability and liability in a wrongful birth
341
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action. Unfortunately, many courts deciding the issue of wrongful birth have not realized
the judicial efficacy of this approach. Only seven courts have specifically stated that the
purpose for which the parents who had a procedure to avoid the birth of an unplanned or
unwanted child should be determinative (or at least considered) in ascertaining the
negligent doctor’s monetary culpability.
In Custodio, the court did not look to purpose; it simply stated that if the plaintiffs
could prove that a sterilization procedure was negligently performed, and that the
physician had breached his duty to them, they could recover all damages proximately
caused by the defendant physician’s negligence.348 Writing with this broad brush, the
Custodio court introduced the understanding that wrongful birth is a simple cause of
action for negligence and that the rules for recovery of damages for a defendant’s
negligence should not be altered simply because a child is born. Nevertheless, because
the Custodio opinion was harshly criticized for potentially providing the plaintiff parents
a financial windfall as a result of awarding them costs for raising a healthy child,349 later
courts began to consider the purpose of the plaintiff in deciding to avoid giving birth to a
child.
In Hartke v. McKelway,350 the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia determined that the plaintiff sought sterilization not for economic reasons, but
because she had previously suffered an ectopic pregnancy and “feared for her life should
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she become pregnant again.”351 In allowing her to recover damages for the physical and
mental anguish she suffered as a result of the defendant physician’s negligence and in
denying her claim for rearing costs, the court stated: “There is no evidence to support the
view that she sought to avoid the expenses of raising another child. To allow her to
recover the costs of raising this child would be to give her a windfall.”352 Thus, through
determining the purposes for which the plaintiff sought the physician’s services and
awarding damages based upon the injury that the plaintiff sought to avoid, the court was
able to dispose of the case without unduly burdening the negligent physician or unjustly
enriching the new mother. 353
This reasoning is equally appropriate to a case in which the plaintiff proves to
have undergone the medical procedure solely for economic reasons. Aligning itself with
the Hartke court regarding the purpose for which the parents employed the ultimately
negligent physician, the court in Burke held that when the parents’ desire to avoid the
birth of a child was premised on economic or financial reasons and not an eugenic
(avoidance of a feared defect) the plaintiff parents should recover the costs of rearing
from the negligent physician.
However, in a situation involving an attempted avoidance of birth for economic or
financial reasons does not require a balancing of interests test as employed in Burke.354
Although diligent and correct in awarding rearing costs, the Burke court and others that
have preceded and followed it in its reasoning and conclusion have erroneously bowed to
the fallacy that the birth of a healthy child is always a blessed event. Courts that rule that
351
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rearing costs are appropriate but nevertheless adopt the off-setting benefits rule of section
920 of the Restatement are misguided. Any court that treats wrongful birth causes of
action differently from any other cause of action for negligently inflicted harm deviates
from the essential postulate of the law of torts.
When a plaintiff parent proves that the purpose of child avoidance was purely for
financial reasons, the court must recognize that the question is not “whether a doctor
should be forced to pay for the satisfaction and joy and affection which normal parents
would ordinarily have in the rearing and education of a healthy child, the question is
whether the court should hold the negligent physician liable for the consequences of his
tort.”355 The only court that has achieved total success in applying the common law of
torts to a cause of action for wrongful birth is Marciniak. That court made it perfectly
clear that the costs of raising the child to the age of majority may not be offset by the
benefits conferred upon the parents by virtue of the presence of the child in their lives.356
If relevant at all, the intangible notions of satisfaction and joy arguably awarded
to the parents because of the birth of an unplanned or unwanted child should be
considered only by the parents in offsetting their own disposition against having a child
and not by a court. While a child’s smile may ease the burden of rearing, it does nothing
to mitigate the financial expenditures that necessarily will be made on the child’s behalf.
The courts that have failed to realize the difference between these values have
done so erroneously. In completely denying the costs of rearing, or in offsetting those
costs when the plaintiff proves that the medical procedure was undergone for financial
reasons, the courts have failed to fulfill their responsibility of compensating the injured

355
356

Id.
153 Wis.2d 59, 450 N.W.2d 243 (1990).

67

party in a negligence action and have insulated members of the medical profession from
liability for the injuries the negligent physicians have caused.

VI. CONCLUSION
The history of the cause of action for wrongful birth has been replete with the
non-application or misapplication of the fundamentals of the tort for negligently inflicted
harm. Even in the jurisdictions that do recognize the validity of the tort of wrongful
birth, the courts have been incomprehensibly conflicted over the proper measurement of
damages to the parents of an unplanned or unwanted child based on a doctor’s (or other
health-care provider’s) negligence that was the cause in fact of the child’s birth.
Today, there are five approaches courts take regarding the birth of a child that was
sought to be avoided by its parents. First, no compensation is available at all for the tortfeasors’ malpractice, because the birth of a child is always a “blessed event.” Second,
compensation for basic negligence with respect to the physician’s misfeasance is limited
to the costs of the botched procedure and possibly other elements such as pain and
suffering to the parent who underwent that procedure. Third, some courts have held that
if a child is born with an abnormality after an unsuccessful sterilization or abortion
procedure, the plaintiff parents deserve the full costs of rearing that child because of the
doctor’s negligence. Fourth, other courts have held that even when a child is born
healthy and without abnormalities, rearing costs may be awarded to the parents of the
child they sought to avoid, but must be offset by the benefits the parents will derive by
having that child in their lives. Last, an extremely small minority of courts has held that
full rearing costs for an unplanned or unwanted child must be awarded if the parents’
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purpose of avoiding the birth of a child was based on financial reasons and not for
eugenic reasons.
The absurdity of these distinctions is palpable. Courts that have held that the birth
of a child is always a blessing are ignorant of the plaintiff parents’ reasons for avoiding
having the child; often having the child is not a blessing, it is a burden. Additionally,
there is no justification for treating an award of rearing costs differently for a healthy
child and an unhealthy child; neither was wanted, which is why the parent underwent the
sterilization or abortion procedure in the first place. The same is true with respect to the
application of the offsetting benefits rule: if the parents did not want a child, there is no
benefit, there is only a burden.
It is patently disingenuous to treat the tort of wrongful birth differently from any
other claim for holding a defendant liable for the costs of his having negligently inflicted
harm. The interest sought to be protected by an individual who seeks to avoid parenting
a child is paramount because even if it is argued that a child is always a blessing, that
argument is manifestly spurious when the potential parent does not want that blessing.
While the inconsistency of these results may find support in the frailty of human
emotion and sympathy, the disposition of wrongful birth claims should not be based on
such standards. Nor should it be guided by policy-ridden arguments that serve to insulate
negligent physicians from liability for the consequences of their wrongdoing and often
result in denying parents just compensation for the injuries they have suffered. To
properly effect the elementary premise of tort law and the purpose of the damages
remedy, courts hearing claims for wrongful birth should shift their focus away from the
health of the wrongfully born child or the alleged benefits that child may or may not
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provide to the plaintiff parents who were attempting to avoid that child’s birth. Emphasis
should be placed, instead, on the interest the plaintiffs were seeking to protect in
originally deciding not to parent the child. Inquiring into the parents’ motivation for
attempting sterilization or abortion will allow the trier of fact to determine the extent of
the plaintiff’s injury and thereby award them damages commensurate with that injury.
This method of analysis will serve to facilitate rather than frustrate the judiciary’s goal of
compensating the plaintiffs and deterring medical malpractice, while preventing the
possibility of creating windfall verdicts to either party.
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